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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three papers on physician labor supply, food insecurity, and
income inequality. My research broadly explores how public policies and government programs
affect individual behavior and how effectively they alleviate inequality and poverty.
Chapter 1 estimates the impact of a transitory reduction in hours during physicians’ early
career on their long-term labor supply. I exploit the work-hour regulations that limit the
maximum workweek by residents as the source of exogenous variation. The results show that
exposure to the regulations significantly decreases practicing physicians’ labor supply by about
four hours per week on average, with female physicians being more responsive to a given
reduction in early career hours. Distributional results using a changes-in-changes model confirm
that the regulations primarily affect the upper end of the work hours distribution. To reveal
potential mechanisms of these effects, I find that the reform increases the probabilities of
marriage and having a child, as well as the total number of children, for female physicians. In
contrast, it does not have a significant impact on marriage and fertility outcomes for male
physicians. These findings provide a better understanding of physicians’ hours of work in
response to the reform over time and the role of gender with respect to labor supply behavior and
family formation decisions.
Chapter 2 studies the role of government programs in alleviating differential exposure to
food insecurity. We provide a framework that conceptualizes how the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) could have differences in benefit levels across racial/ethnic groups.
We decompose differences in SNAP benefit levels into three components: differences in
eligibility, participation, and generosity. We then link the results to differences in food
consumption to provide implications on food insecurity differentials. Our results reveal that

SNAP has different pathways to reducing food insecurity for different populations. Among the
three components, eligibility contributes the most to SNAP benefits for both blacks and
Hispanics relative to whites. However, SNAP reduces differences in food consumption between
blacks/Hispanics and whites by a modest amount, which is likely not enough to reduce the
differences in the resource gaps between groups. We also provide an exploratory analysis of how
changes to SNAP policy rules might affect differences in food insecurity across groups. Our
results suggest that the automatic enrollment policy might be effective in ameliorating the
disparities.
Chapter 3 estimates the effects of trade liberalization on household income inequality and
investigates whether trade liberalization or domestic reforms are the main influence factors of the
rising inequality since 1980 in Taiwan, a middle-income open economy. We construct an
empirical model by decomposing the sources of household disposable income in the quintile
ratio. Using time-series data from 1980 to 2015 to estimate the long-run effect, we find that trade
liberalization raises income inequality overall. When separating trade partners into OECD and
non‐OECD countries, our results show that net exports to OECD countries increase inequality,
whereas net exports to non-OECD countries insignificantly decrease inequality. Moreover, we
provide evidence that domestic reforms, particularly technological progress in favor of skilled
labor and industrial structural change, rather than trade liberalization, are the main driving forces
of income inequality.
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Chapter 1
The Long-Term Impact of Work-Hour Regulations on Physician Labor
Supply

Judith Liu
Department of Economics and Center for Policy Research
Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 13244-1020
jliu61@syr.edu
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1.1 Introduction
The recent expansion of the health care system and forecasts of physician shortage have
made the issue of physician labor supply increasingly important. Over the last three decades,
average hours worked by physicians have been falling in many developed countries, including
the United States, Canada, and Australia, among others (Buske, 2004; Scott, 2006; Watson et al.,
2006; Crossley et al., 2009; Staiger et al., 2010). There has also been a dramatic change in the
composition of the physician workforce, with the female share of medical students rising from
around 25 percent in the 1970s to around 50 percent nowadays (Chen and Chevalier, 2012).
Most research and policy debates have focused on physician supply at the extensive margin (the
number of practicing physicians), whereas physician supply at the intensive margin (the amount
of patient care hours or services provided by practicing physicians) has been understudied
(Staiger et al., 2010). A better understanding of physicians’ hours of work decisions and gender
differences is crucial for human resource planning purposes in the health care sector.
An important determinant of individuals’ hours of work is their work experience in early
career, but there is little evidence on its long-term consequences. Empirically, it is particularly
difficult to identify sources of exogenous variation to test for causal effects of a transient change
in labor supply. The work-hour regulations that limit the maximum hours worked by residents
provide a plausibly exogenous shift in physicians’ early career hours.
To become a practicing physician in the U.S., an individual must complete three to seven
years of residency training after college and medical school, and then obtain medical licensure to
practice medicine. Traditionally, long hours are a component of residency training, yet they may
contribute to sleep deprivation which compromises patient safety. In order to reduce potential
harm due to overwork of residents, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
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(ACGME) imposed regulations that restrict the average hours worked by residents to 80 hours
per week and enforce standards for their duty hours in 2003. A large number of studies have
examined the effects of the ACGME regulations on patients’ safety and health outcomes, as well
as residents’ education and well-being (Philibert et al., 2013; Bolster and Rourke, 2015); yet the
impacts on physicians’ labor market outcomes have not been thoroughly explored in the
literature. To my knowledge, the only paper that uses the ACGME regulations as a natural
experiment to estimate the effects of early career hours is Wasserman (2018), which focuses on
changes in specialty choice across gender.
This paper investigates whether the reform affects physicians’ hours of work after they
complete residency and do not face the hours constraints anymore. Using monthly data from the
1989-2017 Current Population Survey (CPS), my primary empirical strategy exploits the cohorttime variation in exposure to the ACGME regulations. As a result of the reform, the mean
resident hours per week decrease by 10.03 for males and 6.87 for females. Using a difference-indifferences model with cohort and year fixed effects, the estimates suggest that exposure to the
reform during residency significantly decreases mean hours worked after residency by about four
hours per week, and the effects are not statistically different between male and female
physicians. When taking the effects of the reform on resident hours by gender into account, a
given reduction in hours during residency decreases post-residency hours significantly more for
females than for males.
Since the policy limits the maximum workweek by residents, it should primarily affect
those who would have worked more than 80 hours per week during residency in the absence of
the regulations. To account for this disproportionate impact at the upper end of the hours
distribution, I use a changes-in-changes (CIC) approach proposed by Melly and Santangelo
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(2015), which estimates unconditional treatment effects of the whole distribution in the presence
of covariates. Overall, the CIC estimates provide further evidence of the negative effects of the
reform on long-term labor supply and show that such negative effects become stronger when
moving towards the upper tail of the distribution for both male and female physicians. The
greater impact among those with the longest hours confirms that the reform primarily affects the
upper end of the hours distribution.
As well-documented in the literature related to physician labor supply, gender differences
in hours of work may be attributable to child-rearing (e.g., Sasser, 2005; Wang and Sweetman,
2013; Wasserman, 2018), which suggests a potential mechanism of the above long-term effects.
To guide our understanding about the presence of this mechanism in this context, I further
examine how the reform affects male and female physicians’ marriage and fertility decisions.
The results show that the reform increases the probabilities of marriage and having a child, as
well as the total number of children, for female physicians. In contrast, it has little impact on
marriage and fertility outcomes for male physicians. These findings are consistent with previous
studies and provide strong evidence on gender differences in family formation decisions in
response to a policy that reduces time requirements during the prime childbearing years.
A potential mechanism for the negative impact of the reform on male physicians’ longterm labor supply is through human capital accumulation. Residency can be thought of as on-thejob training to enhance physicians’ skills and productivity. If physicians invest more hours
during residency, they may gain more skills and have higher returns to work after residency,
which increases their subsequent hours of work. The literature finds that the ACGME reform
reduces continuity of care and educational continuity for residents in surgical specialties, and
these losses lead to negative consequences for residents’ professional development and
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preparedness for practice (Feanny et al., 2005; Vidyarthi et al., 2006; McBurney et al., 2008;
Nakayama et al., 2009; Philibert et al., 2013). Since surgical specialties have substantially more
males than females, male physicians experience a greater reduction in human capital during
residency. As a result, the reform decreases their return to work rates after residency, which
causes them to work fewer hours later in life. The negative impact of the reform on long-term
labor supply for male physicians may be explained by this potential mechanism.
This paper has three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it exploits the
work-hour regulations on residents to identify the effects of a reduction in early career hours on
long-term labor supply. The findings aid our understanding of physicians’ hours of work in
response to the reform over time. Second, this paper explores gender differences in labor supply
behaviors, along with marriage and fertility decisions as potential mechanisms. With the
composition of the physician workforce changing dramatically, especially the increasing
participation of females, a better understanding of how males and females respond to policy
changes can suggest ways to orient policies more effectively. Third, this paper contributes to the
research on dynamics of labor supply, for which it is often difficult to find a plausible
identification strategy. This analysis provides important implications for broader economic
theory with respect to intertemporal labor supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
physician work-hour regulations in the United States. Section 3 discusses the conceptual
framework. Section 4 describes the data and shows the effectiveness of the regulations. Section 5
presents the empirical strategy, the identification, and the mean and distributional estimated
results. Section 6 addresses potential mechanisms of the effects. Section 7 concludes.

5

1.2 Physician Work-Hour Regulations in the United States
Medical residency training traditionally requires lengthy work hours, but there was no
regulation limiting the number of hours that could be assigned to a resident physician in the
United States until the late 1980s. The public and the medical education establishment started to
be aware of and to investigate the consequences of overwork by residents after the death of an
18-year-old college freshman, Libby Zion, in 1984. As a result of the investigation, New York
State adopted the recommendations by the committee that evaluated the training and supervision
of physicians in the state, and enacted the Libby Zion Law in 1989. The law forbade residents in
New York State hospitals to work more than 80 hours per week or 24 consecutive hours. It was
the first regulation in the nation that restricted hours worked by residents. However, most
residency programs in New York were found in violation of the law ten years after its
implementation (Wasserman, 2018), and thus the law was likely not adequately enforced.
In June 2002, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)
granted preliminary approval to similar regulations for all residents working in accredited
medical training institutions in the U.S.,1 and the regulations were implemented in July 2003
(Philibert et al., 2002). With the aim to improve patient safety by reducing fatigue-related
medical errors made by residents, the ACGME’s standards consist of (1) a maximum of 80 hours
worked per week, averaged over one month; (2) a 24-hour limit on continuous duty with an
additional six hours allowed for patient transfer, administration, and didactic lectures; (3) one
day in a week free of all medically related duties; (4) a limit on call frequency; (5) a 10-hour rest
period between duty periods or work shifts; (6) a maximum workweek of 88 hours allowed for

1

All of the residency programs for doctors with a Doctor of Medicine (MD) degree and a majority of the programs
for doctors with a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine (DO) degree in the United States are ACGME-accredited.
Following the proposal of the ACGME reform, the American Osteopathic Association (AOA) also adopted similar
work-hour requirements.
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programs in some specialties with a sound educational rationale and the approval of the
Residency Review Committee. In order to comply with the policy, many residency programs
changed rotation schedules, decreased call frequency, and replaced resident services with care by
physician extenders (Philibert et al., 2009). With monitoring through program audits and
periodic surveying of residents, penalties for non-compliance with the regulations included
residency program probation and potential loss of accreditation.2
In 2008, the ACGME proposed minor revisions to the duty hour standards in response to
the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine (IOM). The changes were made to a 16-hour
limit on continuous duty for first-year residents. Residents in their second year and beyond
followed the 24-hour limit with a reduction in additional hours for hand-offs from six hours to
four hours. No changes were made to the 80-hour limit and call frequency. These new standards
went into effect in July 2011. Though these standards were designed to improve patient safety by
reducing residents’ fatigue, they had also led to unintended negative consequences on residents’
attainment of clinical skills. In March 2017, the ACGME further announced a policy change
which raised the maximum number of consecutive hours from 16 to 24 hours for first-year
residents, and this new standard went into effect in July 2017 (Asch et al., 2017).
There is an extensive literature on the effects of the ACGME regulations on residents’
well-being and learning, as well as patients’ safety and health outcomes. Most of the literature
compares the outcomes before and after the reform in 2003 and uses observational cohort
analysis from a single site, multiple sites, or national databases. Overall, the findings suggest that
residents’ well-being is improved between the pre- and post-2003 time periods. Many studies
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According to the investigation one year after the reform, five percent of the 2,235 programs that ACGME reviewed
were found in violation of one of the standards. From the survey of 25,176 residents, 3.3 percent reported working
more than 80 hours per week during the past four weeks.
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show that residents’ fatigue has decreased since the implementation of the reform (Gopal et al.,
2005; Barrack et al., 2006; Hutter et al., 2006; Martini et al., 2006; Landrigan et al., 2008;
Philibert et al., 2013), and some studies find that physicians are having more children, spending
more time to attend family events, and leading less stressful lives since 2003 (Karamanoukian et
al., 2006; Jones and Jones, 2007). However, the effects on residents’ educational outcomes,
patients’ safety, and their health outcomes vary across studies, and some of these effects are
different between medical and surgical specialties.3
Despite numerous studies on the reform, little is known about its effects on physicians’
employment patterns in the long run. To my knowledge, the only paper directly related to labor
supply effects of the ACGME regulations is Wasserman (2018), which focuses on changes in
residents’ specialty choice. She finds that female physicians are more likely to enter a specialty
when the specialty reduces its time requirements due to the reform, but there is little change in
specialty entry response among male physicians. While the regulations reduce physicians’ early
career hours, the question of interest is whether their long-term labor supply decisions are
affected or not. The following analysis estimates the effects of the reform on physicians’ postresidency hours of work, as a measure of long-term labor supply, and addresses potential
mechanisms of the effects.

1.3 Conceptual Framework
To link this short-term policy to longer-term impact on labor supply, there are several
distinct features of physician career paths that need to be taken into account. A physician needs
to complete three to seven years of residency training after college and medical school, and then
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See Philibert et al. (2013) and Bolster and Rourke (2015) for a systematic literature review.
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obtain medical licensure to practice medicine. Residency programs are typically run by hospitals
and have a limited number of residency slots each year. Residents are paid on an annual basis,
which is largely funded by the government, and there is little difference in resident salary across
specialties. Since residents are forced to work a set of hours, their labor supply can be considered
as perfectly inelastic within specialties. Therefore, physicians are likely to have less leisure time
during residency because they are constrained to work more hours than they would otherwise
choose. Despite the number of hours worked during residency, their average hours typically
decrease after completing the training. The wage increases dramatically after residency as most
practicing physicians make considerably more than resident salary, and post-residency salary
varies largely across specialties.
Since residents’ hours of work are constrained by institutional rules regulating labor time
and effort provision, the intertemporal substitution hypothesis with time separable utility does
not fit in this context. Alternatively, a theoretical hypothesis that can be used to explain the longterm labor supply effect is the neoclassical model with non-separable utility (Fehr and Goette,
2007). Holding the wage constant, this model predicts that an increase in a worker’s effort in the
previous period causes a higher disutility of labor in the following period, which decreases the
worker’s labor supply. Since the ACGME reform causes an anticipated transitory reduction in
physicians’ labor supply in early career without changing their wage and lifetime wealth, it
decreases their disutility of effort during residency. Subsequently, it will increase their labor
supply after residency, based on the prediction of this model.
An opposite theoretical hypothesis is the “persistence hypothesis” which states that
individuals’ work experience in early career is a major determinant of subsequent labor supply
due to human capital accumulation, change in family commitments, and taste for work, among
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others (Clark and Summers, 1982). On human capital grounds, those who work more tend to
accumulate more human capital, which in turn increases the return to work relative to leisure in
the future (Heckman and Willis, 1979; Freeman, 1980; Clark and Summers, 1982). Those with a
lack of work experience, on the other hand, may develop family commitments which reduce the
return to work relative to staying outside of the labor force (e.g., Mincer and Polachek, 1974;
Polachek, 1975; Becker, 1985, Gronau, 1988; Angrist and Evans, 1998; Sasser, 2005; Goldin,
2014; Kleven et al., 2018). In addition, individuals’ taste for work could be affected by prior
work experience according to habit formation effects (Clark and Summers, 1982; Clark, 1999).
This hypothesis suggests that a short-term reduction in physicians’ early career hours
tends to persist after residency. Intuitively, human capital accumulated through residency
experience affects labor supply in the future. If physicians invest more hours during residency,
they may gain more skills and have higher returns to work after residency, which increases their
subsequent hours of work. The literature finds that the work-hour limits reduce continuity of care
and educational continuity for residents (Feanny et al., 2005; Vidyarthi et al., 2006; McBurney et
al., 2008; Nakayama et al., 2009), and these losses lead to negative consequences for residents’
professional development and preparedness for practice, especially in surgical specialties
(Philibert et al., 2013). Since there are substantially more male physicians in surgical specialties,
they experience the greatest reduction in resident hours as well as human capital accumulation.
As a result, the reform decreases their return to work rates after residency, which causes them to
work fewer hours later in life.
Other potential mechanisms pertain to family formation decisions. Since the work-hour
regulations affect residency training, which occurs during the prime childbearing years,
physicians would plan the timing of marriage and fertility relative to their residency.
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Theoretically, the regulations alter the labor market conditions for residents and thus change their
opportunity cost of time factored into the fertility transition. Previous research has shown that the
reform results in physicians having more children, spending more time to attend family events,
and leading less stressful lives (Karamanoukian et al., 2006; Jones and Jones, 2007).
Consequently, these changes in family commitments may decrease their labor-force attachment
and keep them from developing further their careers.
The dynamic impact of children on labor market outcomes also greatly depends on
spousal income (Goldin, 2014). In two-income households, if their partner is doing well
financially, they may feel more comfortable pulling back on their hours. As such, physicians
with higher-earnings spouses have a lower opportunity cost of career interruptions (Sarma et al.,
2011). According to the AMA Masterfile, nearly 40 percent of physicians marry another
physician or health care professional. In addition, most of the female physicians are married to
male physicians, while the reverse is not true (Sasser, 2005). With higher-earnings physician
spouses, who also work long hours, new physician mothers face more binding constraints on
hours and a lower opportunity cost of career interruptions. Therefore, they are more likely to
reduce their post-residency hours than male physicians, who are less likely to have physician
spouses. In Section 6, I provide empirical evidence on the mechanisms pertaining to marriage
and fertility across gender.
Overall, the neoclassical model with non-separable utility predicts that the ACGME
regulations decrease physicians’ disutility of work during residency and thus increase their labor
supply in the long run. In contrast, the persistence hypothesis suggests that the regulations reduce
resident hours and at the same time lower the opportunity cost of work time, especially for those
who would have worked more than the work-hour limits in the absence of the reform. This could
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lead to less human capital, more family commitments, and habit formation effects for those
exposed to the reform, and thus results in a reduction in hours worked over time. From the above
discussion, the potential impact of the ACGME regulations on long-term labor supply is
ambiguous due to the contradicting effects between these two hypotheses; therefore, empirical
evidence is needed to better understand physicians’ employment patterns. As it will be presented
in Section 5, my empirical results are consistent with the persistence hypothesis and suggest that
the short-run reduction in labor supplied persists even when physicians are not bound by the
work-hour limits.

1.4 Data and the Effectiveness of the Reform
1.4.1 Data Construction and Summary Statistics
This analysis uses data from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1989
and 2017. Administered by the U.S. Census Bureau, the monthly CPS is a household-based
survey which selects a nationally representative sample and contains a large amount of
demographic and employment information. To identify physicians in the CPS, I restrict the
sample to the civilian non-institutional population who hold an advanced degree and reported
their occupation as a “physician or surgeon.”
Whether a physician was exposed to the work-hour regulations is based on the year of
residency training, but such information is not available in the CPS. Inspired by Staiger et al.
(2010), I identify physicians as residents if they were younger than 35 and use the year of birth
as a proxy for exposure to the ACGME regulations.4 Physicians who could have been potentially
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According to the 2007 AMA Physician Masterfile data, which is the primary source of physician workforce data in
the U.S., Staiger et al. (2010) point out that 97% of hospital-based physicians younger than 35 were residents.
However, not all residents were trained in a hospital-based program, and thus using age 35 to identify residency
status might lead to a potential source of bias. This problem is addressed in Section 5.3.
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subjected to the regulations were born after 1968 (i.e., those who worked as a resident after
2003), and they are categorized as the treatment group. For physicians trained in New York,
although they might have been potentially exposed to similar regulations, the Libby Zion Law,
most residency programs in New York were found in violation of the law (Wasserman, 2018). In
addition, I use the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data to test whether
there was a significant decrease in resident hours around the implementation of the law in 1989.5
Figure 1.1 shows that the average hours worked by residents remained fairly stable around 1989
and changed little through the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the law was inadequately
enforced.6 On the other hand, the average hours worked by residents decreased sharply following
the imposition of the work-hour limits in 2003, demonstrating that the ACGME regulations
effectively led to hours cut. Therefore, the central variation in the empirical analysis below
comes from the cohort-time variation in exposure to the 2003 ACGME reform.
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, more than 95 percent
of the physicians graduated from medical school after age 26. In addition, by the end of the
sample period in 2017, the oldest possible age that the treatment group can achieve is 48.
Therefore, the analysis focuses on physicians aged 26 to 48 with non-missing values for weekly
hours worked.7 The analysis sample comprises 70,868 physicians. It is worth noting that this
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The monthly CPS does not provide the hours worked variable before 1989, which is the main reason why the
analysis period starts from 1989.
6
I also look at the trend for New York only and find no significant change in hours worked by residents around 1989
either. However, the sample size of New York physicians in the ASEC is very small (around 30 observations per
year on average), and thus it is not informative enough.
7
The measure of hours worked is based on the self-reported hours in the previous week in the monthly CPS. An
alternative measure is the usual number of hours per week (over an unspecified time period), but it is not available
until 1994 in the monthly data. I chose the former for the analysis since it has a relatively shorter-term recall and is
available for a longer period of time. Note that the hours worked measure is top-coded at 99 hours prior to 1994;
however, there are only 690 observations (about 1%) in the sample at the top-coded value of 99 before 1994.

13

selected group are at their prime working and childbearing ages, which helps understand the role
of job flexibility in the work-family interface.
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics of this analysis sample. The mean age of the
sample is 37.61, and approximately 66 percent of the subjects are male. The average hours
worked per week is 54.62 (standard deviation = 18.37). With respect to gender differences, male
physicians tend to be slightly older and have smaller proportion of the treated population due to
the increasing female share of physicians in recent decades. In addition, male physicians work
about seven hours more than their female counterparts, and they have a higher rate of marriage
and have more children on average. With respect to differences by treatment status, the treatment
group is older and comprises more females. The average hours worked per week is 54.40 for the
treatment group and 54.89 for the control group.
There are many advantages of using the monthly CPS data for this analysis. First, it
provides repeated cross-sectional observations over a longer time period than any other
comparably sized dataset that includes physicians’ information. This is particularly useful for
analyzing the effects on lifecycle patterns. The large enough sample also helps conduct analyses
separately by subpopulations and run robustness tests using different regression specifications.
Second, the CPS includes important demographic characteristics and employment information.
These variables matter for identification because they allow us to account for dynamic changes
in the composition of the physician workforce that might cause potential imbalances in the
demographic characteristics between the treatment and control groups. Third, the CPS data are
more up-to-date than the American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile in terms of
physicians’ employment information and can be used as a benchmark dataset on physician labor
supply (Staiger et al., 2009). Fourth, it is widely conjectured that residents’ self-reported hours
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from the ACGME monitoring data may underestimate hours worked due to the desire to protect
residency programs or pressure from residency program directors (Landrigan et al. 2006;
Szymczak et al. 2010; Fargen and Rosen, 2013). The CPS data, collected by non-ACGME
researchers, limit the potential for this type of misreporting.
Nevertheless, the CPS lacks physician-specific information regarding residency training
and specialty choice. Therefore, I cannot directly identify the treatment status and analyze some
of the other interesting labor market outcomes. In addition, the information on income is topcoded in the CPS for confidentiality reasons. More than 85 percent of the sample analyzed here
has top-coded values or missing values in weekly earnings at ages 35 to 48.8 For these reasons, it
is difficult to provide direct evidence on how the regulations change physicians’ earnings
profiles over time.

1.4.2 First Stage: The Effectiveness of the Reform
To assess the effectiveness of the regulations for the analysis, I plot the trends in hours
worked by resident and non-resident physicians using the analysis sample in Figure 1.2. Prior to
2003, residents were not exposed to the work-hour limits. As shown, the average hours worked
per week by residents remained high through 2002 and then declined sharply after the
preliminary approval of the ACGME reform in 2002 and its implementation in 2003. The
average resident hours per week decreased from 63 in 2002 to 58 in 2004. This sharp decline
after the introduction of the reform provides evidence that the regulations were enforced.
On the contrary, such plummet was not found in the work hours trend of nonresident
physicians since they were not restricted by the regulations. Instead, their hours worked have

8

Total weekly earnings are top-coded at $1923 prior to 1997 and $2885 since 1998. For hourly wages, more than 90
percent of the physicians in the CPS have missing values.
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gradually trended downward since the 1990s. This trend can be largely explained by the aging of
the physician population and the increasing proportion of female physicians, who practice fewer
hours than their male counterparts on average (Crossley et al., 2009; Staiger et al., 2010; Sarma
et al., 2011, Wang and Sweetman, 2013). Staiger et al. (2010) also point out other possible
factors that drive the downward trend of hours worked by practicing physicians, such as the
decrease in physician fees since the early 1990s, developments among both public and private
payers in the 1990s, and improvements in physician productivity due to technology. In addition,
the rapid growth in care by hospitalists in the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Kuo et al., 2009)
and the HMO penetrations in the 1990s (Zhan et al., 2004) may also be attributed to the
decreasing hours worked by practicing physicians.
Figure 1.3 compares the trends in hours worked between physicians who were exposed to
the regulations and those who were not. As a result of the reform, the treatment group
(physicians born after 1968) worked fewer hours per week than the control group (physicians
born before 1968) during residency (ages 26 to 34). Interestingly, the difference in hours worked
between the treatment and control groups still remained even when physicians were not
constrained by the work-hour limits after residency (above age 35), showing a persistent decline
in hours worked. Compared to physicians, there is no persistent and significant difference in
hours worked between the younger and older cohorts for the other professions that also make a
fairly high salary and require an advanced degree (e.g., lawyers and dentists), as shown in Figure
1.A1 in the Appendix. This comparison provides additional evidence on the substantial impact of
the reform on physician labor supply.
In addition to visual evidence, I estimate the effect of the reform on resident hours for the
full sample and by gender. Since residency programs must comply with all the work-hour
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standards, they should be considered as a whole when interpreting the estimated effects. The
empirical specification is as follows:
Y𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Exposed𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 ,

(1)

where Y𝑖 is the weekly hours worked by physician i aged 26 to 34. Exposed𝑖 is a dummy
variable indicating exposure to the ACGME regulations during residency training, which equals
1 for physicians born after 1968 and 0 for physicians born before 1968. 𝑋𝑖 is a set of covariates
including age, gender, and race/ethnicity. 𝛼𝑐 , 𝛼𝑡 , and 𝛼𝑠 denote cohort, year, and state fixed
effects, respectively. The estimates of 𝛽1 identify the effects of the reform on resident hours and
are shown in the first row of Table 1.2. As a result of the reform, the mean resident hours per
week significantly decreased by 8.38 overall, which supports the effectiveness of the ACGME
reform. Analyzing by gender, the reform reduced the mean resident hours per week by 10.03 for
males and 6.87 for females.9

1.5 The Impact on Long-Term Labor Supply
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
A fundamental challenge in interpreting the pattern shown in Figure 1.3 as causal is that
the cohort variation that identifies differences in exposure to the regulations is time-series in
nature. Omitted variables that are correlated with changes in labor supply and the exposure, and

9

This effect is smaller among females than among males for two reasons. First, there are fewer female physicians
whose hours were capped by the regulations. In my analysis sample, only the top 20 percent of the female control
group exceeds 80 hours worked per week. Wasserman (2018) also shows that females were less likely to choose the
most time-intensive specialties where the hours worked by residents were more than 80 hours per week before the
reform. Hence, the majority of the female physicians were not primarily affected by the reform, and the mean
estimate of the effect on resident hours is attenuated. Second, females are found to enter more time-intensive
specialties as a result of the reform, whereas there is little change in males’ specialty choice (Wasserman, 2018). If
females change their specialty choice in response to the reform, they are also potentially altering their residency
hours towards longer hours. This behavioral change increases mean hours worked by female residents and balances
out the effect on resident hours which were originally designed to reduce hours worked.
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other secular trends that affect physician hours, might explain this pattern as well, resulting in an
identification problem. To tackle this problem and identify the causal impact, I begin by the
baseline difference-in-differences approach using the cohort-time variation in exposure to the
ACGME regulations. Since the reform affects residents trained after 2003, the strategy is to
compare the change in hours worked from residency to post-residency between the treatment and
control groups. The regression framework of the baseline model is as follows:
Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿1 Exposed𝑐 + 𝛿2 Post 𝑡 + 𝛿3 (Exposed𝑐 ∙ Post 𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 ,

(2)

where i indexes physicians, c indexes birth cohorts, and t indexes years. The outcome variable
Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the weekly hours worked by physicians. Similar to the definition in Equation (1),
Exposed𝑐 is an indicator of exposure to the ACGME regulations during residency training.
Post 𝑡 is an indicator of completing residency in year t, which equals 1 for physicians aged 35-48
and 0 for physicians aged 26-34. 𝛿3 is the coefficient of interest. To identify it as the casual
impact, the treatment and control groups are assumed to have the same trends in hours worked
over time in the absence of the regulations.
Figure 1.4 shows the trends in post-residency hours between the treatment and control
groups after the implementation of the 2003 ACGME reform. There does not seem to be a
significant difference between groups over time. However, it is unclear from this figure
regarding the role of the reform since there are some factors that affect labor supply and also
correlate with exposure to the regulations, as suggested by the summary statistics in Table 1.1. In
particular, the control group consists of older physicians, who are likely to work fewer hours per
week, whereas the treatment group consists of more female physicians, who are likely to work
less than their male counterparts.
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To account for potential imbalances in the demographic characteristics between the
treatment and control groups, I control for pre-treatment baseline observables. I also expand the
model by including cohort and year fixed effects to control for additional unobserved factors.
Compared to the inclusion of the two indicators, Exposed𝑐 and Post 𝑡 , these fixed effects flexibly
span the cohort-time variation. The empirical specification can be written as:
Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1 (Exposed𝑐 ∙ Post 𝑡 ) + 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 .

(3)

𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a set of pre-determined demographic controls including age, gender, and race/ethnicity. 𝛼𝑐
reflects fixed effects for birth cohorts, and 𝛼𝑡 reflects fixed effects for the calendar year in which
they are observed. The cohort fixed effects control for differences across cohorts in the outcome
variable, and the year fixed effects control for any general time trends in the outcome variable,
picking up some of those possible factors that drive the long-term secular decline in physician
work hours mentioned in Section 4.2. I also add a set of state dummies 𝛼𝑠 to control for any
time-invariant unobservables that affect the outcome variable across states. In particular, it
accounts for the state differences in the institutional design features, such as state-specific
licensing requirements. I do not include controls which may cause potential endogeneity with
respect to labor supply (e.g., family formation and practice setting). The coefficient 𝛽1 identifies
the treatment effect by contrasting the hours worked from residency to post-residency between
physicians who were exposed to the regulations and those who were not.
Previous studies have documented differences in labor market outcomes between male
and female physicians (e.g., Rizzo and Blumenthal, 1994; Sasser, 2005; Rizzo and Zeckhauser,
2007; Wang and Sweetman, 2013; Wasserman, 2018). In addition, my regression results (shown
in Section 5.2) also indicate that gender has a significant impact on long-term labor supply. In
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addition to the analysis on the full sample, I also estimate the effects by gender to explore
whether the ACGME regulations affect male and female physicians differently.
The key identifying assumption in Equation (3) is the so-called parallel trends
assumption, that is, the evolution of hours worked between the treatment and control groups
(conditional on observed variables) is the same over time in the absence of the reform. This
analysis has several advantages in meeting this condition. First, the ACGME regulations were
enacted in order to reduce fatigue-related medical errors made by residents. The motivation and
the nature of this policy make it unlikely to be correlated with other policies that affect physician
labor supply or costs of childrearing. Second, the sample is fairly homogeneous with respect to
skills and other traits. Since this analysis is based on a profession that has highly competitive
entry requirements, rigorous educational standards, and very specialized training, the general
concern about unobserved heterogeneity across individuals or cohorts is considerably
diminished. Since the model includes cohort and year fixed effects, and a set of demographic
controls, the estimated effects on the outcome variables can be attributed to changes in hours
worked during residency training within cohorts over time.

1.5.2 Estimated Mean Effects
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results using the baseline difference-in-differences model,
specified in Equation (2), for the overall sample and by gender. Each cell contains the mean
hours worked for its subgroup of the sample. For the overall sample shown in Panel A, the
residency versus post-residency difference in hours is 9.07 for the treatment group and 7.15 for
the control group. Thus, the treatment group worked 1.93 less hours per week than the control
group from residency to post-residency. With a standard error of 0.87, it is statistically different
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from zero at the 5 percent level. The analysis by gender is shown in Panels B and C. Among
male physicians, the treatment group decreases weekly hours worked by 1.09 (or 2.26 percent)
more than the control group, but the estimate is statistically insignificant. Among female
physicians, the treatment group decreases weekly hours worked by 1.63 (or 2.90 percent) more
than the control group.
Controlling for observed demographic differences between groups and the cohort and
year fixed effects, the preferred estimates of the long-term labor supply effects using Equation
(3) are shown in Table 1.4. Columns (1) and (2) display the results for the full sample, without
and with the inclusion of demographic controls, respectively. The first row reports the estimated
coefficients of interest. The estimate in Column (2) implies that the reform decreases physicians’
mean hours worked at ages 35 to 48 by 4.28 hours per week, which is a statistically significant
7.99 percent decrease over the control group mean of 53.59 hours. Columns (3) to (6) show the
estimates by gender. The results indicate that the regulations reduce both male and female
physicians’ long-term hours worked by about four hours per week on average, and the effects are
not statistically different across gender (p-value = 0.67). These findings are robust to the
inclusion of the covariates. The next six rows in Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the estimated
coefficients of the demographic characteristics on long-term hours worked. Among all three
columns, the average hours worked decrease significantly with age, and as shown in Column (2),
gender seems to have a large and significant impact on post-residency hours, with males working
more than females by 7.09 hours per week.
Since men tend to enter specialties that require longer hours worked, there are more male
physicians whose hours were capped by the regulations. To obtain the effects of a given
reduction in hours during residency on subsequent labor supply, I take into account the effects of
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the reform on resident hours and divide the reduced form coefficients in Columns (2), (4), and
(6) by their corresponding first-stage estimates. For the full sample, a reduction in hours during
residency decreases labor supply at ages 35 to 48 by 0.51 hours per week on average (standard
error = 0.02). Analyzing by gender, a reduction in hours during residency results in a decrease of
0.39 hours (standard error = 0.02) for males and 0.65 hours (standard error = 0.05) for females
after residency.10 Although female physicians in general were less likely to be restricted by the
work-hour limits, these findings suggest that females are more responsive to a given reduction in
early career hours caused by the reform, and this gender difference is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level.
There are a few observations with likely unreliable self-reported hours in the data.11 To
address this concern and reduce the impact of possibly spurious outliers, I repeat the analysis
using winsorized and trimmed hours worked at the 1% and 99% levels, as well as the 5% and
95% levels, as alternative outcome variables. Winsorizing at the 1% and 99% levels sets the
bottom 1% to the 1th percentile and the top 1% to the 99th percentile. Without discarding the
extreme values, the winsorization method still takes those values into account and treats them as
if respondents reveal certain information on their hours worked. The estimated effects using
these alternatives are very similar to the results shown above.12

1.5.3 Potential Threats to Identification
Although the inclusion of control variables and the homogeneity of the physician
workforce ameliorate potential threats from unobserved confounders, there may still be at least

10

These estimates are obtained by -4.28/-8.38 = 0.51 for the full sample, -3.96/-10.03 = 0.39 for males, and -4.45/6.87 = 0.65 for females.
11
The maximum of self-reported hours worked is 192 in the data, which is obviously exaggerated.
12
The results are available upon request.
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two other concerns regarding the identification. The first problem pertains to the year-of-birth
proxy for treatment status. Ideally, I would use the year of residency to identify individual
exposure to the ACGME reform, but the CPS does not contain such information. This may result
in misclassifications of the treatment and control groups. The second problem pertains to any
remaining unobserved heterogeneity of exposure to the regulations with respect to labor supply. I
discuss below these identification issues and how I attempt to assess them.
First, using age 35 to identify residency status is a potential source of bias. Depending on
the medical specialty, the length of residency training ranges from three to seven years.13 This
leads to some variation in the age that a physician can complete residency. 14 There are two
possible misclassifications of the treatment status: (1) physicians who were born after 1968 and
completed residency training before 2003, and (2) physicians who were born before 1968 and
completed residency training after 2003. In the first case, the treatment group contains nontreated individuals; in the second case, the control group contains treated individuals. As a
consequence, the magnitude of the estimated effects would be underestimated in both cases.
To assess the effects of potential misclassifications, I estimate three alternative
specifications which reclassify the treatment and control groups with tighter year-of-birth
windows, and the age proxies for residency status are also adjusted accordingly. Since the main
analysis uses physicians born before and after 1968 as the control and treatment groups,
respectively, the alternative specifications adjust the year-of-birth proxies for the treatment status
as follows: (1) the treatment (control) group consists of physicians born after 1969 (before 1967);

13

For example, internal medicine, general surgery, and neurosurgery require three, five, and seven years of training,
respectively.
14
Nearly all physicians graduate from medical school after age 26. With a minimum of three years for residency
training, the earliest possible age to complete residency is 29. Similarly, with a maximum of seven years for
residency training and allowing a gap of five years at some point, the oldest possible age to complete residency is
likely to be 38.
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(2) the treatment (control) group consists of physicians born after 1970 (before 1966); (3) the
treatment (control) group consists of physicians born after 1971 (before 1965). When using
tighter year-of-birth windows for the treatment status, there should be less misclassification;
however, it discards non-negligible amount of observations. As shown in Table 1.A1 in the
Appendix, the results using these alternative treatment and control groups are similar to the main
results.
Second, there may still exist some unobserved factors that cause nonrandom selection of
individuals into the physician workforce following the implementation of the reform. It could be
that the reform changed the pool of applicants and entrants into the medical profession in
dimensions not captured by the admission criteria and observed characteristics, but are relevant
to the labor market. Specifically, given the decline in hours requirements during residency,
individuals who prefer balanced lifestyles would be induced to enroll in medical school. These
unobserved preferences are correlated with a priori disposition toward fewer hours worked at
later ages, which would lead to a decrease in the average hours worked by physicians over time.
As a result, the magnitude of the negative effects of the reform on long-term labor supply would
be overstated.
To assess whether the effects are driven by this selection bias, I estimate an alternative
specification, taking as the treatment group physicians who already entered medical school at the
time of the reform but were trained under the new regulations during residency. Given that the
ACGME regulations were approved in 2002 and that the fresh college graduates in 2002 were
born in 1979-1980, I restrict my sample to the 1941-1980 cohorts and re-estimate the effects.
Since there may be some physicians enrolling in medical school few years after college, I also
restrict the sample to the 1941-1978 cohorts and the 1941-1976 cohorts to test the robustness of
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my results. As shown in Table 1.A2 in the Appendix, the key estimates are robust to these
alternative specifications, suggesting that the likelihood of this self-selection confounding the
results is not considerable.
Although unobserved heterogeneity seems less applicable to physicians who have been
through highly competitive admission process and invested many years in formal training
beyond college with the completion of medical school and residency training, the above
robustness check suggests that remaining unobservable heterogeneity is not a significant
concern. Other empirical studies also find no evidence of reduced hours worked driven by
unobserved preferences for balanced lifestyles among younger physician cohorts (Crossley et al.,
2009; Staiger et al., 2010; Sarma et al., 2011).

1.5.4 Distributional Effects
According to the ACGME work-hour standards, the regulations should primarily affect
residents who would have worked more than the work-hour limits (e.g., 80 hours per week) in
the absence of the reform. This naturally leads to a disproportionate impact on those at the upper
tail of the hours distribution. As shown in Table 1.A3 in the Appendix, only those above the 75th
percentile among the control group aged 26-34 (unaffected residents) work over 80 hours per
week. The estimated mean impacts may be attenuated by the other part of the distribution and
incompletely reveal the effects on those affected.
To identify the heterogeneous impacts across the hours distribution, I use a changes-inchanges (CIC) model following Athey and Imbens (2006) and Melly and Santangelo (2015) that
extends the model to include covariates. The CIC framework relaxes the parallel trends
assumption and provides unconditional treatment effects of the whole distribution. The estimated
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quantile treatment effects provide evidence on what would happen to the overall hours
distribution in the long run if there is a policy regulating the maximum workweek during
residency. I estimate the CIC effects for 17 quantile values, q = {0.1, 0.15, …, 0.85, 0.9}, and
their bootstrapped 95-percent confidence intervals with 1,000 replications, controlling for age,
gender, race/ethnicity, and cohort and year fixed effects.
Figure 1.5 shows the CIC estimates for the full sample (Panel A) and by gender (Panels B
and C). In general, the effects become negative and stronger when moving towards the upper end
of the work hours distribution. As shown in all three panels, the quantile treatment effects are not
statistically different from zero between the 10th and the 70th quantiles, and the effects become
negative and larger than the mean estimates at the top of the distribution. This finding confirms
that the reform primarily affects those with the longest hours of work. For the full sample, the
estimates above the 80th quantile are statistically different from zero and remain stable at around
-5.36. For male physicians, the estimates above the 75th quantile are statistically significant and
have an average level of -8.47. For female physicians, the estimates are imprecisely estimated,
but overall negative and hovering around -5.11 for those above the 70th quantile (except for the
80th quantile). At the extreme upper tail of the distribution (the 90th quantile), the magnitudes of
the effects for male and female physicians are similar.
There are two potential reasons why the effects are greater for males than for females at
most of the upper quantiles. First, since hours worked by male physicians at the upper quantiles
are more likely to be capped by the regulations, the reform reduces their long-term labor supply
more than their female counterparts. Second, more female physicians enter the most timeintensive specialties as a result of the reform, whereas there is little change in specialty choice by
male physicians (Wasserman, 2018). If more female physicians enter long-hours specialties in
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response to the reform, they are also potentially altering their residency hours and increasing
hours worked after residency. The link between changes in specialty choice and hours worked
provides a potential explanation and mechanism for the gender difference in the effects of the
reform on the distribution of hours worked.15

1.6 Mechanisms
The work-hour regulations reduce physicians’ early career hours and at the same time
lower the opportunity cost of work time. As discussed in Section 3, this could lead to less human
capital, more family commitments, and change in taste for work for the treatment group.
Therefore, the reform results in a negative impact on physicians’ long-term labor supply. Since
the regulations affect residency training, which occurs during the prime childbearing years, the
mechanisms pertaining to marriage and fertility decisions are particularly of interest. Various
studies suggest that home production is disproportionately undertaken by females even within
this highly skilled profession (e.g., Sasser, 2005; Wang and Sweetman, 2013; Wasserman, 2018).
Women may choose the specialty and work environment that are family friendly, and avoid jobs
with long hours and greater career advancement possibilities. Wang and Sweetman (2013) show
that married female physicians work fewer hours per week than both their married male
counterparts and their unmarried female counterparts. The impact of children on women’s labor
market outcomes is large and persistent, whereas there is little evidence on such impact on men.
The CPS data allow us to learn about the presence of marriage and fertility mechanisms
in the context of the ACGME reform and whether there are gender differences in these

15

There are two caveats of these estimated quantile treatment effects. First, the existence of point masses in the
hours worked data might contaminate the effects, and thus the results must be evaluated with caution. Second,
whether men or women are more responsive to a given reduction in resident hours across the hours distribution is
unknown without knowing the corresponding distributional effects of the reform on resident hours.
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mechanisms. I use the following regression framework to investigate the impact of exposure to
the regulations on male and female physicians’ marriage and fertility outcomes:
Y𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Exposed𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 𝛽2 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 .16

(4)

When examining the marriage mechanism, I use binary indicators of marriage and divorce for
physicians between ages 26 and 48 as the outcome variables. For the effects on fertility
decisions, I examine two outcomes: (1) fertility at the extensive margin, which is an indicator of
having at least one child; (2) fertility at the intensive margin, which is the total number of
children (completed fertility).17 By contrasting these outcomes between physicians who were
exposed to the regulations and those who were not, the estimates of 𝛽1 show the effects of
interest. The identification is based on the selection-on-observables assumption; that is, there is
no unobserved factor that affects both outcomes (marriage and fertility) and treatment (exposure
to the reform). This assumption plausibly holds since the reform is not correlated with other
policies that would affect physicians’ marriage and childrearing. The set of control variables and
the homogeneity of the physician workforce also make the identification assumption more
plausible to be satisfied.
Table 1.5 shows the effects of the work-hour regulations on the likelihoods of marriage
and divorce between ages 26 and 48, controlling for demographic characteristics (age, gender,
and race/ethnicity), year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) show the
results using the full sample, and Columns (3) to (6) present the effects by gender. The estimated
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Note that this is not a difference-in-differences model. Contrary to hours of work, there is little variability in
marriage and fertility outcomes during residency, and most of the variability comes from the post-residency period.
Instead of using a difference-in-differences model which contrasts the outcomes from residency to post-residency
between groups, I use the regression framework specified in Equation (4) to capture the overall effect of the reform
on marriage and fertility outcomes.
17
According to the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems, completed fertility is
defined as the number of children to a person by the end of a woman’s childbearing years, 15 to 44 years old, the
latest age at which people typically have their last child.
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coefficients of interest, shown in the first row, suggest that the reform significantly increases the
probability of marriage by 9.2 percentage points and slightly decreases the probability of divorce
by 1.5 percentage points for female physicians. Conversely, there is no significant impact on
male physicians’ marriage and divorce rates. These estimates suggest that marriage decisions
made by females are more sensitive to the work-hour regulations than those made by males.
Table 1.6 presents the estimated effects of the regulations on physicians’ fertility between
ages 26 and 48. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the effects on fertility at the extensive margin for
the full sample and by gender. The estimates suggest that the reform increases the probability of
having a child for female physicians by 9 percentage points, which is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. However, the reform does not affect the probability of having a child for
male physicians. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show the estimated effects on completed fertility. The
results also suggest a substantial gender difference. Exposure to the regulations leads to a
significant increase of 0.2 children for female physicians, but it does not affect the total fertility
of male physicians.18 In addition, I estimate the effects for physicians aged 26-34 and 35-48
separately, as shown in Table 1.A5 in the Appendix. These estimates provide suggestive
evidence on how the reform changes the timing of marriage and fertility beyond the total impact
of the reform. The results indicate that the reform increases the marriage and fertility outcomes
in the post-residency period more than those during residency, but they are not statistically
different from each other.
To sum up, I find substantial gender differences in both marriage and fertility decisions in
response to the reform. The regulations raise the likelihood of marriage and have positive and
significant effects on fertility at both the extensive and intensive margins for female physicians.

18

The estimation results using probit and logit models for the binary outcomes of marriage and fertility are similar
to the above results, as shown in Table A4 in the Appendix.
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On the contrary, the regulations have little impact on marriage and fertility outcomes for male
physicians. During the childbearing years, these effects for females may result in a potentially
supply shift that accounts for at least some of the decrease in their long-term labor supply. As
discussed in Section 3, most female physicians are married to physician spouses, who are likely
to have high earnings and work long hours. As the marriage and fertility rates increase for female
physicians due to the reform, they likely face greater household obligations and more binding
constraints on hours with a lower opportunity cost of career interruptions. As a result, this
situation would lead them to work fewer hours, more regular schedules, and generally more
conducive to combining career and family. The estimated results in this section provide
empirical evidence to support potential mechanisms of females’ labor supply responses to a
policy that reduces time requirements during the prime childbearing years. Changes in family
commitments likely account for females’ greater responsiveness to a given reduction in hours.
These findings are also consistent with previous studies on gender differences in the relationship
between childbearing and labor market outcomes (e.g., Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Polachek,
1975; Becker, 1985, Gronau, 1988; Angrist and Evans, 1998; Sasser, 2005; Wang and
Sweetman, 2013; Goldin, 2014; Kleven et al., 2018; Wasserman, 2018).

1.7 Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of the work-hour regulations that limit the maximum
hours worked by residents on physicians’ long-term labor supply. As a result of the 2003
ACGME reform, the mean resident hours per week significantly decrease by 10.03 for males and
6.87 for females. Exploiting the cohort-time variation in exposure to the reform, I contrast the
hours worked from residency to post-residency between the treatment and control groups using a
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difference-in-differences approach. The results suggest that the reform significantly reduces
mean hours worked after residency by about four hours per week for both male and female
physicians. When taking the effects of the reform on resident hours into consideration, women
seem to be more responsive to a given reduction in early career hours caused by the reform.
The heterogeneous impacts across the hours distribution are revealed by a changes-inchanges model. The estimated quantile treatment effects show that the reform does not have a
statistically significant impact on those below the 70th quantile of the hours distribution. When
moving towards the upper tail of the distribution, the effects become significantly negative and
larger than the mean estimates, which confirms that those at the upper end of the distribution are
primarily affected by the reform. Since hours worked by male physicians are more likely to be
capped by the regulations, the reform reduces their long-term labor supply more than their
female counterparts at the upper quantiles. However, at the extreme upper tail of the distribution,
the magnitudes of the effects for male and female physicians are similar.
To reveal potential mechanisms of the effects uncovered on long-term labor supply, I
examine how the regulations affect physicians’ marriage and fertility outcomes across gender.
The empirical evidence suggests substantial gender differences in marriage and fertility choices
in response to the reform that reduces work time requirements during the prime childbearing
years. It indicates that changes in family commitments could be potential mechanisms for
females’ long-term labor supply effects. On the other hand, since there are substantially more
male physicians in surgical specialties that suffer the greatest reduction in hours due to the
reform, they may experience detrimental effects on their professional development and
preparedness for practice. The mechanism of human capital accumulation might potentially
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account for males’ long-term labor supply effects, although I am not able to explore this
mechanism empirically.
With increasing participation of females in the physician workforce and limited evidence
on long-term labor supply responses to a reduction in early career hours, the physicians’ hours of
work decisions and potential gender differences are substantive issues for human resource
policies in the health care sector. With respect to the effects of the reform on long-term labor
supply, the reduction of four hours per week among practicing physicians in younger cohorts
does not seem small. Policy makers may need to take into account changes in the amount of
patient care hours or services provided by practicing physicians when addressing the projected
supply of healthcare. With respect to gender differences in marriage and fertility decisions, the
results indicate that less time requirements may help women plan the timing of marriage and
fertility relative to their residency. Since residency training occurs during the prime childbearing
years, and nowadays almost half of the medical students are women, developing workplace
policies to accommodate pregnancy and childbearing is important for the medical profession.
Future research may consider using other physician surveys that include information on earnings
and other dimensions of physicians’ labor market outcomes. In particular, dynamic changes in
earnings profiles caused by the regulations can give important insight into labor supply behavior.
The findings can also provide direct evidence of the resulting effects on the gender wage gap.
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Figure 1.1: Average Hours Worked per Week by Residents, 1976-2017, Using the ASEC Data
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Figure 1.3: Age-Hours Profiles by Treatment Status
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Figure 1.4: Average Hours Worked per Week by Treatment Status
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Figure 1.5: Changes-in-Changes Estimates
A. Full Sample
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quantile values, controlling for age, gender, and race/ethnicity. Dotted lines provide bootstrapped pointwise 95percent confidence intervals for quantile treatment effects with 1,000 replications.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
All

Gender

Treatment Status

Male

Female

Treatment

Control

38.090
(6.209)

36.672
(6.159)

34.192
(5.262)

40.219
(5.606)

0.575
(0.494)

0.731
(0.444)

Age

37.608
(6.228)

Male

0.660
(0.474)

White

0.697
(0.459)

0.721
(0.448)

0.651
(0.477)

0.623
(0.485)

0.757
(0.429)

Black

0.059
(0.235)

0.047
(0.211)

0.083
(0.275)

0.068
(0.253)

0.050
(0.219)

Hispanic

0.057
(0.231)

0.057
(0.233)

0.055
(0.229)

0.063
(0.244)

0.054
(0.226)

Asian

0.181
(0.385)

0.169
(0.375)

0.204
(0.403)

0.239
(0.426)

0.134
(0.340)

Other race

0.006
(0.077)

0.005
(0.073)

0.007
(0.083)

0.006
(0.079)

0.006
(0.074)

Married

0.757
(0.429)

0.783
(0.412)

0.706
(0.456)

0.694
(0.461)

0.806
(0.395)

Number of children

1.318
(1.290)

1.439
(1.335)

1.083
(1.163)

0.980
(1.183)

1.579
(1.312)

Family Size

3.193
(1.565)

3.335
(1.599)

2.919
(1.459)

2.820
(1.479)

3.477
(1.570)

Weekly hours worked

54.616
(18.373)

56.974
(17.645)

50.033
(18.887)

54.404
(18.527)

54.886
(18.217)

Exposure

0.438
(0.496)

0.380
(0.486)

0.551
(0.497)

Observations

70,868

46,784

24,084

27,061

41,495

Notes: Table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses), weighted using sampling weights. The sample
includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The treatment group includes physicians
born after 1968, and the control group includes physicians born before 1968.
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Table 1.2: The Impact of the Reform on Resident Hours
Outcome:
Hours worked at ages 26-34

All

Male

Female

Exposed

-8.384***
(0.952)

-10.029***
(1.392)

-6.868***
(2.080)

Age

-2.039***
(0.095)

-1.837***
(0.131)

-2.367***
(0.190)

Male

4.501***
(0.541)

Black

-0.895
(0.743)

-2.695*
(1.464)

0.542
(0.976)

Hispanic

0.317
(0.910)

0.460
(1.062)

0.480
(1.311)

-2.813***
(0.614)

-2.850***
(0.620)

-2.559**
(1.074)

Other race

4.841*
(2.610)

4.428
(4.738)

4.182
(3.219)

Cohort FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

22,708

13,615

9,093

Asian

Observations

Notes: The dependent variable is weekly hours worked at ages 26 to 34. White is the omitted group for race/ethnicity
variables. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-differences Estimates of the Impact on Long-Term Labor Supply
Ages 26-34
(Residency)

Ages 35-48
(Post-Residency)

Difference (%)

Treatment group

58.420

49.346

-9.074 (-15.532%)

Control group

60.733

53.586

-7.147 (-11.768%)

Difference

-2.313

-4.240

A. Full Sample

Difference-in-differences
[Standard Error]

-1.927 (-3.764%)
[0.872]**

B. Male
Treatment group

60.089

52.462

-7.627 (-12.693%)

Control group

62.635

56.098

-6.537 (-10.437%)

Difference

-2.546

-3.636

Difference-in-differences
[Standard Error]

-1.089 (-2.256%)
[1.046]

C. Female
Treatment group

56.238

44.927

-11.311 (-20.113%)

Control group

56.235

46.557

-9.678 (-17.210%)

Difference

0.003

-1.630

Difference-in-differences
[Standard Error]

-1.633 (-2.903%)
[1.167]

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The treatment group
includes physicians born after 1968, and the control group includes physicians born before 1968. Data are weighted
using CPS sampling weights, and the standard errors are clustered by cohort. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels
is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results of the Impact on Long-Term Labor Supply
Outcome:
Hours worked
Exposed*Post

All

Male

Female

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-4.385***
(0.916)

-4.281***
(0.901)

-4.034***
(0.877)

-3.961***
(0.868)

-4.476***
(1.275)

-4.445***
(1.274)

Age

-0.631***
(0.061)

-0.574***
(0.066)

-0.741***
(0.089)

Male

7.086***
(0.434)

Black

0.014
(0.585)

-0.525
(1.047)

0.571
(0.644)

Hispanic

-0.191
(0.516)

-0.441
(0.643)

0.474
(1.061)

Asian

-2.270***
(0.374)

-2.627***
(0.456)

-1.698***
(0.573)

Other race

3.959***
(1.463)

3.907
(2.375)

4.265***
(1.530)

Cohort FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FEs

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

68,556

68,556

45,453

45,453

23,103

23,103

Observations

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. White is the omitted
group for race/ethnicity variables. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by
cohort are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Table 1.5: The Impact of the Reform on Marriage and Divorce
All

Male

Female

Married

Divorced

Married

Divorced

Married

Divorced

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Exposed

0.050***
(0.017)

-0.002
(0.006)

0.028
(0.018)

0.007
(0.008)

0.092***
(0.022)

-0.015*
(0.008)

Age

0.019***
(0.001)

0.004***
(0.0004)

0.019***
(0.001)

0.003***
(0.0004)

0.018***
(0.002)

0.005***
(0.001)

Male

0.039***
(0.011)

-0.026***
(0.004)

Black

-0.151***
(0.022)

0.0003
(0.009)

-0.134***
(0.030)

0.004
(0.012)

-0.167***
(0.027)

-0.004
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.016)

0.010
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.017)

0.018
(0.013)

-0.009
(0.028)

-0.008
(0.010)

0.039***
(0.011)

-0.026***
(0.004)

0.021
(0.015)

-0.022***
(0.004)

0.068***
(0.017)

-0.032***
(0.007)

Other race

-0.071
(0.043)

-0.016
(0.011)

0.011
(0.048)

-0.010
(0.015)

-0.196***
(0.064)

-0.030*
(0.017)

Year FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

68,556

68,556

45,453

45,453

23,103

23,103

Hispanic
Asian

Observations

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The dependent
variable are indicators of being married or divorced on the timing of the survey. White is the omitted group for
race/ethnicity variables. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Table 1.6: The Impact of the Reform on Fertility Decisions
All

Male

Female

Extensive

Intensive

Extensive

Intensive

Extensive

Intensive

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.026
(0.021)

0.039
(0.043)

-0.004
(0.019)

-0.048
(0.047)

0.090**
(0.034)

0.202***
(0.059)

Age

0.034***
(0.002)

0.092***
(0.004)

0.032***
(0.002)

0.091***
(0.004)

0.039***
(0.003)

0.092***
(0.005)

Male

0.034***
(0.011)

0.195***
(0.030)

Black

-0.107***
(0.022)

-0.253***
(0.059)

-0.151***
(0.032)

-0.337***
(0.092)

-0.050**
(0.025)

-0.157**
(0.065)

Hispanic

-0.032*
(0.018)

-0.114**
(0.044)

-0.014
(0.019)

-0.060
(0.052)

-0.064**
(0.029)

-0.203***
(0.067)

Asian

0.016
(0.011)

-0.078**
(0.030)

0.005
(0.014)

-0.118***
(0.041)

0.035*
(0.018)

-0.014
(0.040)

Other race

-0.048
(0.047)

-0.173
(0.130)

-0.001
(0.057)

-0.057
(0.185)

-0.117**
(0.057)

-0.356**
(0.146)

Year FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

68,556

68,556

45,453

45,453

23,103

23,103

Exposed

Observations

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The dependent
variables are: (1) fertility at the extensive margin: an indicator of having at least one child and (2) fertility at the
intensive margin: the number of children on the time of the survey. White is the omitted group for race/ethnicity
variables. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Appendix
Figure 1.A1: Age-Hours Profiles by Cohort
A. Physicians

Average weekly hours

75

Control (born before 1968)

70

Treatment (born after 1968)

65
60
55
50
45
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Age

B. Lawyers, judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers
Average weekly hours

60

Born before 1968

55

Born after 1968

50
45
40
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Age

Average weekly hours

60

C. Dentists
Born before 1968

55

Born after 1968

50
45
40
35
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
Age
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Table 1.A1: Estimation Results of the Impact on Long-Term Labor Supply
– Using Tighter Year-of-Birth Windows for Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment

Control

All
After 1968 Before 1968
(Main analysis)
After 1969

Before 1967

After 1970

Before 1966

After 1971

Before 1965

Male
After 1968 Before 1968
(Main analysis)
After 1969

Before 1967

After 1970

Before 1966

After 1971

Before 1965

Female
After 1968 Before 1968
(Main analysis)
After 1969

Before 1967

After 1970

Before 1966

After 1971

Before 1965

Eq. (3), no controls

Eq. (3), controls

-4.385***
(0.916)
-5.073***
(1.317)
-5.296***
(1.260)
-5.030**
(2.154)

-4.281***
(0.901)
-5.080***
(1.229)
-5.301***
(1.378)
-4.850**
(2.391)

-4.034***
(0.877)
-4.741***
(1.200)
-5.494***
(1.276)
-4.789***
(1.602)

-3.961***
(0.868)
-4.646***
(1.208)
-5.379***
(1.305)
-4.465***
(1.562)

-4.476***
(1.275)
-5.205***
(1.768)
-4.613**
(2.148)
-4.957
(4.267)

-4.445***
(1.274)
-5.142***
(1.752)
-4.596**
(2.118)
-4.955
(4.262)

Observations

68,556
57,856
48,087
39,436

45,453
38,767
32,502
27,066

23,103
19,089
15,585
12,370

Notes: Each cell contains an estimate of the effect on post-residency hours. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort
are in parentheses. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated
with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively. Three alternative specifications are used to test the robustness of the results. The
treatment status (defined by year of birth) and residency status (defined by age) associated with each row are as
follows, where the first one is used in the main analysis.
(1) Treatment: born after 1968; Control: born before 1968. Residency: ages 26-34; Post-residency: ages 35-48.
(2) Treatment: born after 1969; Control: born before 1967. Residency: ages 26-33; Post-residency: ages 36-48.
(3) Treatment: born after 1970; Control: born before 1966. Residency: ages 26-32; Post-residency: ages 37-48.
(4) Treatment: born after 1971; Control: born before 1965. Residency: ages 26-31; Post-residency: ages 38-48.
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Table 1.A2: Estimation Results of the Impact on Long-Term Labor Supply
– Excluding Nonrandom Selection into Treatment

All
1941-1991 Cohorts
(Main analysis)
1941-1980 Cohorts
1941-1978 Cohorts
1941-1976 Cohorts
Male
1941-1991 Cohorts
(Main analysis)
1941-1980 Cohorts
1941-1978 Cohorts
1941-1976 Cohorts
Female
1941-1991 Cohorts
(Main analysis)
1941-1980 Cohorts
1941-1978 Cohorts
1941-1976 Cohorts

Eq. (3), no controls

Eq. (3), controls

-4.385***
(0.916)
-5.043***
(0.718)
-5.492***
(0.773)
-5.948***
(0.835)

-4.281***
(0.901)
-4.929***
(0.692)
-5.434***
(0.745)
-5.909***
(0.803)

-4.034***
(0.877)
-4.294***
(0.895)
-4.660***
(0.954)
-4.677***
(1.029)

-3.961***
(0.868)
-4.186***
(0.889)
-4.523***
(0.946)
-4.575***
(1.020)

-4.476***
(1.275)
-5.767***
(1.101)
-6.442***
(1.198)
-7.556***
(1.292)

-4.445***
(1.274)
-5.741***
(1.099)
-6.449***
(1.197)
-7.556***
(1.289)

Observations

68,556
62,819
60,461
57,485

45,453
42,471
41,272
39,620

23,103
20,348
19,189
17,865

Notes: Each cell contains an estimate of the effect on hours worked after residency. Cluster-robust standard errors by
cohort are in parentheses. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is
indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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Table 1.A3: Percentiles of the Distribution of Weekly Hours Worked
Observations

Mean
(SD)

5

Percentiles of the distribution
10
25
50
75
90

95

32

40

40

60

72

80

90

32

40

47

60

75

90

99

24

32

40

50

60

70

80

25

35

40

50

60

80

84

36

40

45

60

75

80

95

40

40

50

60

80

94

99

32

40

40

50

60

75

80

34

40

45

55

65

80

85

28

36

40

55

70

80

90

23

30

40

52

70

90

99

20

25

40

40

52

65

75

20

24

40

45

60

70

80

All, ages 26-34
Treatment group

14,919

Control group

7,789

58.420
(19.078)
60.733
(20.159)

All, ages 35-48
Treatment group

12,142

Control group

33,706

49.346
(16.471)
53.586
(17.493)

Male, ages 26-34
Treatment group

8,215

Control group

5,400

60.089
(18.566)
62.635
(19.302)

Male, ages 35-48
Treatment group

7,011

Control group

24,827

52.462
(16.123)
56.098
(16.807)

Female, ages 26-34
Treatment group

6,704

Control group

2,389

56.238
(19.516)
56.235
(21.398)

Female, ages 35-48
Treatment group

5,131

Control group

8,879

44.927
(15.940)
46.557
(17.459)

Notes: Table reports means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and percentiles of weekly hours worked, weighted
using sampling weights. The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The
treatment group includes physicians born after 1968, and the control group includes physicians born before 1968.
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Table 1.A4: The Impact of the Reform on Marriage and Fertility Decisions
All

Male

Female

Probit

0.050***
(0.015)

0.029*
(0.016)

0.089***
(0.021)

Logit

0.050***
(0.016)

0.030*
(0.018)

0.089***
(0.021)

Probit

-0.001
(0.006)

0.006
(0.008)

-0.012*
(0.007)

Logit

-0.002
(0.007)

0.005
(0.009)

-0.012*
(0.007)

Probit

0.026
(0.020)

0.001
(0.017)

0.080**
(0.035)

Logit

0.028
(0.020)

0.005
(0.017)

0.081**
(0.036)

Married

Divorced

Fertility
(Extensive)

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The independent
variables include exposure to the regulations, age, gender, race/ethnicity, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects.
Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively. The effects is based on the
average marginal effects using probit and logit models.
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Table 1.A5: The Impact of the Reform on Marriage and Fertility Decisions
All

Male

Female

Ages 26-34

0.011
(0.030)

-0.032
(0.045)

0.069
(0.050)

Ages 35-48

0.044**
(0.011)

0.022*
(0.012)

0.087***
(0.027)

Ages 26-34

0.005
(0.009)

0.015
(0.018)

-0.006
(0.008)

Ages 35-48

0.0003
(0.006)

0.006
(0.009)

-0.009
(0.011)

Ages 26-34

-0.040
(0.034)

-0.074**
(0.033)

0.013
(0.049)

Ages 35-48

0.021
(0.017)

-0.001
(0.018)

0.066*
(0.034)

Ages 26-34

-0.060
(0.074)

-0.112
(0.074)

0.027
(0.095)

Ages 35-48

-0.005
(0.057)

-0.081
(0.061)

0.133
(0.083)

Married

Divorced

Fertility
(Extensive)

Fertility
(Intensive)

Notes: The sample includes physicians aged 26-48 in the monthly CPS between 1989 and 2017. The independent
variables include exposure to the regulations, age, gender, race/ethnicity, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects.
Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights. Cluster-robust standard errors by cohort are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels is indicated with 1, 2, 3 asterisks respectively.
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2.1 Introduction
Food insecurity is a serious and persistent problem in the United States, and the
prevalence of food insecurity varies considerably among households with different demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2018). As shown in Figure 2.1, blackand Hispanic-headed households perennially have substantially higher rates of food insecurity
(e.g. 21.8% and 18% in 2017, respectively) than white-headed households (8.8% in 2017).19
Previous studies have shown that the health outcomes associated with food insecurity are related
to children’s long-term cognitive and non-cognitive skills that affect human capital investments
(e.g., Alaimo et al., 2001; Currie, 2006; Currie, 2009; Almond et al., 2011) and ultimately adult
earnings (e.g., Currie, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2015; Bellani and Bia, 2016). Therefore, differential
exposure to food insecurity early in life has the potential to heighten and preserve economic
inequality. In addition, food insecurity is a likely contributing factor to the disadvantage of those
relevant subgroups (e.g., blacks, Hispanics, and immigrants) (e.g., Ratcliffe, 2015; ColemanJensen et al., 2016). These groups have received considerable attention from policymakers and
academics since some of them have higher rates of poverty and use of public programs at rates
greater than the majority populations (e.g., Currie, 2003; Jensen, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2015).
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food
Stamp Program) is the largest food-assistance program in the U.S. While it is designed to
alleviate food insecurity, the program also serves to mitigate the consequences of poverty. Many
studies have addressed how SNAP lowers food insecurity overall (e.g., Wilde and Nord, 2005;
Gundersen, et al. 2011; Ratcliffe et al., 2011), but little is known about how SNAP mitigates
differences in food insecurity exposure by race/ethnicity and other demographic characteristics.

19

The measure of food insecurity captures household access to food, which may be different from actual nutrition
intake.
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Our previous study (Flores-Lagunes et al., 2018) finds that SNAP does not have a significant
impact on group differences in food insecurity exposure but has potentially different pathways to
affect food insecurity for different populations.
This paper aims to provide a closer examination of the role of SNAP on differential
exposure to food insecurity. We develop a sequential framework that helps understand how
policy rules that are not designed to take into consideration group membership, such as race and
ethnicity, can yet have different effects across groups. We decompose the differences in SNAP
benefit levels across racial/ethnic groups into three components: (1) the eligibility component –
the proportion of households that are eligible for SNAP; (2) the participation component – the
propensity to enroll in SNAP among eligible households; (3) the generosity component – the
magnitude of SNAP benefits that eligible and participating households receive. Since policy
makers are ultimately interested in differences in food consumption and food insecurity
exposure, we show that differences in SNAP benefit levels can be linked to differences in food
consumption through a factor of proportionality given by the marginal propensity to consume
food (MPCF) out of SNAP benefits. The relative importance of differences in eligibility,
participation, and generosity obtained by our decomposition remain the same regardless of
whether we are looking at SNAP benefit levels or food consumption outcomes.
We use data from the December Current Population Survey (CPS) between 2003 and
2016, along with its Food Security Supplement (FSS), and impute SNAP eligibility and benefits
for the analysis sample. We decompose group differences in SNAP benefits into the three
components described above. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that differences
in the proportion of being eligible alone can explain a substantial part of the total difference in
the mean benefits for both black-white and Hispanic-white differentials. Second, participation
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leads to an upward shift of the benefit levels for blacks, but it has little impact for Hispanics. In
contrast, the generosity component increases Hispanics’ SNAP benefits, but it is negligible for
blacks. Third, combining our results with the estimated MPCF out of SNAP benefits in Hastings
and Shapiro (2018), SNAP reduces the food consumption gaps between blacks/Hispanics and
whites by a modest amount, which is likely not enough to reduce the differences in the resource
gaps between groups.
We also provide an exploratory analysis of how changes to SNAP policy rules might
affect differences in food insecurity across groups by examining three counterfactual policy
scenarios. The first scenario is constant transfer, which provides all participants the same amount
of SNAP benefits. The second scenario involves automatic enrollment, which makes all eligible
households automatically enroll in the SNAP program. The third scenario is universal eligibility,
which makes all households become eligible for SNAP. Among these policy counterfactuals,
automatic enrollment raises both blacks’ and Hispanics’ benefit levels relative to whites the
most. The constant transfer policy slightly increases benefits for blacks relative to whites, but it
substantially lowers the differences in benefit levels between Hispanics and whites, compared to
the baseline decomposition. Universal eligibility has little impact on the differences between
blacks and whites, as well as Hispanics and whites. Overall, our results suggest that, among the
three exploratory policy scenarios, the automatic enrollment policy may be the most effective in
alleviating differences in exposure to food insecurity across racial and ethnic groups.
Overall, this paper contributes to our broader understanding of policies designed to
reduce poverty in several ways. First, we uncover the pathways through which SNAP may have
on the existing heterogeneity in exposure to food insecurity over the demographic groups under
consideration. Second, we provide a framework that conceptualizes how a color-blind program,
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like SNAP, could have differences in benefit levels across groups and affect inequality. The
structural model developed in this paper allows us to parse out different components of the
program and tell what would happen to inequality when a policy change occurs. Third, this
technique can be applied to other social programs and can help policy makers target policies
more effectively to alleviate social and economic inequality.20
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Section 3 describes the model used to
decompose differences in SNAP benefit levels and shows how it can be linked to differences in
food consumption. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics and
results. Section 6 concludes and discusses future work.

2.2 Background
In 2017, about 15 million households were food insecure in the U.S., including 5.8
million with “very low” food security (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2018). The main policy lever
against exposure to food-related hardship in the U.S. is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program). In fiscal year 2017, SNAP
provided benefits to 20.8 million households at a cost of $68 billion, which is much larger than
any other food and nutrition assistance programs such as Women Infants and Children (WIC),
the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), and the School Breakfast Program (USDA, 2019).
In addition, SNAP is the most universal and unrestricted food-assistance program: virtually
available to all households that meet the financial and nonfinancial eligibility criteria.

20

For instance, our decomposition analysis can be used to investigate how states’ economic and policy environments
shape the educational disparities in mortality rates over time, as found in Montez et al. (forthcoming).
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To be eligible for SNAP, a typical household must meet three financial criteria, while
households with a disabled member or a member whose age is 60 or above face less stringent
criteria. The criteria are: (1) gross monthly income does not exceed l30 percent of the poverty
line (or 165 percent of the poverty line for households with an elderly or disabled member); (2)
net monthly income is at or below the poverty line, where net income is calculated as gross
income minus allowable deductions (including a 20 percent deduction from gross income, a
standard deduction, a deduction for households incurring expenses in the care of their children
and/or disabled dependents, a medical deduction for expenses, and a shelter deduction for costs
above 50% of a household’s net income, computed before the shelter deduction and capped
except for elderly or disabled households); (3) countable assets are no more than $2,250 (or
$3,250 for households with an elderly or disabled member). Besides these three main criteria,
able-bodied adults without dependents are limited to receiving benefits for 3 months out of each
36-month period if they do not meet certain work requirements.
SNAP provides monthly benefits to eligible households to purchase food items at SNAPauthorized retailers with an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card.21 The monthly SNAP benefit
amount is the maximum SNAP allotment, varied by household size, less 30 percent of a
household’s net monthly income, and the benefit amount is subject to a minimum amount.22 In
fiscal year 2017, the average benefit level was about $254 per household per month (USDA,
2019). To receive SNAP benefits, program applicants must provide required documentation and

21

Since June of 2004, all States have implemented the Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system.
Note that the poverty line is nonlinearly related to household size and composition. The USDA adjusts the income
eligibility standards, the deductions, and the maximum allotments at the beginning of each fiscal year, which takes
effect from October 1st of the previous year to September 30th of the current year. The changes are based on
changes in the cost of living. These parameters are the same for all states in the continental U.S. but different for
Alaska and Hawaii.
22
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participate in an interview. After initial eligibility, recipients must be recertified every 6 to 24
months.
Coleman-Jensen et al. (2018) points out that the rates of food insecurity are higher than
the national average for certain populations.23 In particular, blacks and Hispanics have
substantially higher rates of food insecurity than whites over time (Figure 2.1).24 Using data from
Oklahoma, Nam et al. (2015) also shows that whites experience significantly lower incidence of
food insecurity than the minority groups (African Americans, American Indians, and Hispanics).
To better understand the differential exposure to food insecurity, our previous study (FloresLagunes et al., 2018) uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to assess the contribution of
different factors to the observed group differences in food insecurity incidence and severity by
race, ethnicity, and immigrant status. These factors are an “endowment component,” attributable
to group differences in observable household characteristics, and a “structural component,”
attributable to group differences in the structure linking the observable household characteristics
to food insecurity. Our finding is suggestive of the heterogeneity in the relative importance of the
factors (endowment and structure) contributing to the observed differences in food insecurity
exposure across these demographic groups.
How does SNAP affect the inequality in food insecurity exposure? Unlike other food and
nutrition programs (e.g., WIC and NSLP), SNAP is universal in the sense that it is not targeted at
specific demographic groups; i.e., it is blind to race and ethnicity. However, different
racial/ethnic groups might have different household characteristics and participate in SNAP at

23

For example, black- and Hispanic-headed households, low-income households, single-headed households with
children.
24
Note that this is based on all households in the U.S. Similarly, Flores-Lagunes et al. (2018) shows that blacks and
Hispanics have substantially higher rates of food insecurity than whites using the target population in our analysis,
which will be introduced in Section 2.4.
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different rates, which results in different SNAP receipt and benefit levels. For instance, one
possible explanation to the disparate patterns in food insecurity among the groups analyzed is
that they may participate in SNAP at different rates. Therefore, SNAP could potentially have
different pathways to affect food insecurity for different populations. Motivated by this, we
further take a closer examination of the role played by SNAP and the potentially different
determinants of program participation across groups.

2.3 Decomposition of SNAP
To understand the role of SNAP on differential exposure to food insecurity over the
demographic groups under consideration, we decompose group differences in SNAP benefit
levels into three components: (1) the eligibility component – the proportion of households that
are eligible for SNAP; (2) the participation component – the propensity to enroll in SNAP among
eligible households; (3) the generosity component – the magnitude of SNAP benefits that
eligible and participating households receive.

2.3.1 Baseline model
We consider a population with two non-overlapping subgroups indexed by 𝑔 ∈ {0,1}. Let
0 denotes the population of whites, and 1 denotes the population of blacks. To fix ideas, we start
with the simplest case of the decomposition analysis, with binary indicators of SNAP eligibility
and generosity. For any household in group g, we observe a binary variable for eligibility, 𝐿𝑔 ,
where 𝐿𝑔 = 1 if a household is eligible for SNAP, and 𝐿𝑔 = 0 if a household is not eligible for
SNAP. Among eligible households, we observe whether eligible households take up their SNAP
benefits or not, captured by a dummy variable 𝑇𝑔 . It equals 1 if a household is enrolled in SNAP,
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and 0 otherwise. For those who participate in SNAP, some of them qualify for a high amount of
SNAP benefits, 𝑌, while others qualify for a low amount of benefits which, for the purposes of
𝑌

this example, we set it to 2 . Let 𝐻𝑔 be an indicator of receiving the high amount, which equals 1
if a participating household receives the high amount, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the expected
value of SNAP benefits for group g can be calculated as:
𝑌

𝐸[𝑌𝑔 ] = 𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑔 = 1) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑔 = 1|𝐿𝑔 = 1) ∙ [𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑔 = 0|𝐿𝑔 = 1, 𝑇𝑔 = 1) ∙ 2 +
𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑔 = 1|𝐿𝑔 = 1, 𝑇𝑔 = 1) ∙ 𝑌].
The difference in the mean SNAP benefit levels between groups is
∆𝑌 = 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 0].
We can decompose this overall difference into the following three components related to
SNAP:
(1) Eligibility: the group difference in the proportions of households that are eligible. To obtain
this, we calculate the counterfactual expected outcome where group 1 has the same eligibility
rate as group 0:
𝑌

𝐸[𝑌 𝐶1 |𝑔 = 1] = 𝑃𝑟(𝐿0 = 1) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝑇1 = 1|𝐿1 = 1) ∙ [𝑃𝑟(𝐻1 = 0|𝐿1 = 1, 𝑇1 = 1) ∙ 2 +
𝑃𝑟(𝐻1 = 1|𝐿1 = 1, 𝑇1 = 1) ∙ 𝑌].
The contribution of eligibility to the overall difference is equal to
∆𝐿 = 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌 𝐶1 |𝑔 = 1],
where the two terms on the right-hand side are the same except for the part corresponding to
the eligibility component. As is clear from the above, the contribution of this component will
disappear if group 1 and group 0 have the same proportion of households being eligible for
SNAP.
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(2) Participation: he group difference in the participation rates. To obtain this, we calculate the
counterfactual expected outcome where group 1 has the same eligibility and take-up rates as
group 0:
𝑌

𝐸[𝑌 𝐶2 |𝑔 = 1] = 𝑃𝑟(𝐿0 = 1) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝑇0 = 1|𝐿0 = 1) ∙ [𝑃𝑟(𝐻1 = 0|𝐿1 = 1, 𝑇1 = 1) ∙ 2 +
𝑃𝑟(𝐻1 = 1|𝐿1 = 1, 𝑇1 = 1) ∙ 𝑌].
The contribution of participation to the overall difference (∆ 𝑇 ) is equal to
𝐸[𝑌 𝐶1 |𝑔 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌 𝐶2 |𝑔 = 1],
where everything is equal except for the part corresponding to participation component.
(3) Generosity: the group difference in the proportions of households who qualify for the high
amount. To obtain this, we calculate the counterfactual expected outcome where group 1 has
the same amount of benefits as group 0: 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 0], and the contribution of generosity to
the overall difference (∆𝐺 ) is equal to
𝐸[𝑌 𝐶2 |𝑔 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 0].
∆𝐺 will become zero if group 1 and group 0 receive the same amount of SNAP benefits.
Altogether, the three group differences add up to the overall difference, that is, ∆𝑌 = ∆𝐿 +
∆ 𝑇 + ∆𝐺 . Since the eligibility and generosity components are based on predetermined and
known policy rules of the SNAP program, group differences in these two components are
deterministic and entirely due to differences in the composition of these groups.

2.3.2 Numerical Example
We use the following numerical example to illustrate how this decomposition works.
Suppose the high amount of SNAP benefits (𝑌) is equal to 500 dollars per month. For
households in group 1, 50 percent are eligible for SNAP, among which 50 percent enroll and a
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fraction of 0.3 qualify for the high amount of benefits. For households in group 0, 30 percent are
eligible for SNAP, among which 60 percent enroll and one-fourth qualify for the high amount of
benefits. The above information is summarized in Table 2.1.
Hence, the expected SNAP benefits for group 1 is equal to
𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 1] = 0.5 × 0.5 × (0.7 × 250 + 0.3 × 500) = 81.25,
and the expected SNAP benefits for group 0 is equal to
𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 0] = 0.3 × 0.6 × (0.75 × 250 + 0.25 × 500) = 56.25.
The overall difference in the average SNAP benefits is ∆𝑌 = 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌|𝑔 = 0] = 25,
which means that blacks receive 25 dollars more of SNAP benefits per month than whites on
average.
Using the counterfactual expected outcomes, we can calculate the contributions of
eligibility, participation, and generosity to the overall difference. First, the contribution of
eligibility is equal to
∆𝐿 = 81.25 − 0.3 × 0.5 × (0.7 × 250 + 0.3 × 500) = 32.5.
Second, the contribution of participation is equal to
∆ 𝑇 = 0.3 × 0.5 × (0.7 × 250 + 0.3 × 500) − 0.3 × 0.6 × (0.7 × 250 + 0.3 × 500) = −9.75.
Third, the contribution of generosity is equal to
∆𝐺 = 0.3 × 0.6 × (0.7 × 250 + 0.3 × 500) − 56.25 = 2.25.
Based on this example, the decomposition of the overall difference in SNAP benefit levels
between groups shows that the three components contribute to the black-white differential
differently, with the eligibility component being somewhat more important than the other two.
The participation component contributes a negative effect to the overall difference. Altogether,
these three components sum up to the overall difference:
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∆𝐿 + ∆ 𝑇 + ∆𝐺 = 32.5 − 9.75 + 2.25 = 25.
In addition to the decomposition, this model also allows us to evaluate counterfactual
policy scenarios. We consider the following three scenarios: (1) constant transfer: assuming all
the SNAP participants receive the high amount of 500 dollars per month; i.e., 𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑔 =
1|𝐿𝑔 = 1, 𝑇𝑔 = 1) = 1; (2) automatic enrollment: assuming all eligible households enroll in
SNAP; i.e., 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑔 = 1|𝐿𝑔 = 1) = 1; (3) universal eligibility: assuming all households are
eligible for SNAP; i.e., 𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑔 = 1) = 1. Table 2.2 shows the calculated effects of changes in
SNAP policy rules on group differences in SNAP benefits and the three components, in
comparison with the baseline result shown in Column (1). As seen in Columns (2)-(4), automatic
enrollment increases the average benefit level of blacks relative to whites the most, and this is
mostly attributable to the participation component. Constant transfer also raises the average
benefit level of blacks, in which the eligibility and participation components have contradicting
effects, with the former outweighs the latter. In contrast, universal eligibility decreases SNAP
benefits of blacks relative to whites, and this is mainly attributable to the participation
component.

2.3.3 General Setting
In this section, we discuss more formally and generally the conditions required for this
decomposition to work. Fortin et al. (2011) show that standard decomposition methods, such as
Oaxaca and Blinder, rely on the assumption of ignorability. Ignorability essentially imposes that,
conditional on the value of observable characteristics, the distribution of potential outcomes is
independent of the treatment status. Here, we impose a modified version of this ignorability
assumption.
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Let 𝑌(1) be the potential value of the SNAP benefit a household receive if the household
belongs to group 1, and 𝑌(0) be the counterfactual value of the SNAP benefit that the household
could have receive if the household were to belong to group 0. Let 𝑋 be the variables that
unequivocally determine both eligibility and generosity of the program. Our key assumption is
then:
𝑌(1) = 𝑌(0)|𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋.
This assumption essentially restricts eligibility and benefit levels to be invariant to group
membership. That is, conditional on eligibility and participation, SNAP benefits are not different
between groups. This assumption can be easily verified by a casual look at the program rules.
Imposing this condition allows us to bypass the need to identify the structural component of
standard decompositions since this component is trivially equal to zero. That is, all of the
differences in 𝐸[𝑌|𝐺 = 𝑔] between groups must be accounted by composition effects.
As argued by Fortin et al. (2011), the structural component of a decomposition exercise
can be thought as a treatment effect (of group membership on the outcome), and the composition
effect reflects differences in the distribution of predetermined characteristics between groups.
Imposing the assumption above, we immediately obtain the result that the structural component,
the treatment effect of group membership on SNAP benefit levels, is zero. Thus, if any
differences in average benefit levels are observed between groups, this must be entirely
accounted by their differences in the distribution of (𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋). It is useful to write the joint
distribution of (𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋) using the factorization formula:
𝑓(𝑡, 𝑙, 𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥)Pr[𝐿 = 𝑙|𝑋 = 𝑥]Pr[𝑇 = 𝑡|𝐿 = 𝑙, 𝑋 = 𝑥].
It is important to note that if 𝑋 includes all characteristics that affect eligibility, then Pr[𝐿 =
𝑙|𝑋 = 𝑥] becomes degenerate; that is, it must be either zero or one. In addition, we know that 𝑇

64

is zero whenever 𝐿 is zero and that 𝑌 is zero unless 𝑇 and 𝐿 are one. Since the deterministic
function of (𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋), 𝑌(𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋), is degenerate, we obtain:
𝑌(𝑇, 𝐿, 𝑋) = 𝑇(𝐿(𝑋))𝐿(𝑋)𝑚(𝑋),
given a known function 𝑚(𝑋). Therefore, the expected value of the SNAP benefit for
households in group 𝑔 is
𝐸[𝑌|𝐺 = 𝑔] = Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 𝑔] Pr[𝑇 = 1|𝐿 = 1, 𝐺 = 𝑔] 𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 𝑔],
where Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 𝑔] = Pr[𝑋 ∈ 𝐴|𝐺 = 𝑔], where 𝐴 is the set of values of 𝑋 that determine
the eligibility of a household. It is relevant to note also that the set 𝐴 is not indexed by 𝑔, that is,
eligibility thresholds are the same regardless of group membership. For the third term in the
equation above, we have that
𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 𝑔] = ∫ 𝑌(1,1, 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 𝑔)𝑑𝑥,
which can be re-written as ∫ 𝑓(𝑥|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 𝑔)𝑚(𝑥)𝑑𝑥.
To sum up, the overall difference in the observed SNAP benefit levels between groups
can be decomposed into three components:
∆𝑌 = ∆𝐿 + ∆ 𝑇 + ∆𝐺 ,
where
∆𝐿 = (Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 1] − Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 0]) Pr[𝑇 = 1|𝐿 = 1, 𝐺 = 1] 𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 1];
∆ 𝑇 = Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 0]( Pr[𝑇 = 1|𝐿 = 1, 𝐺 = 1] − Pr[𝑇 = 1|𝐿 = 1, 𝐺 = 0]) 𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 =
1, 𝐺 = 1];
∆𝐺 = Pr[𝐿 = 1|𝐺 = 0] Pr[𝑇 = 1|𝐿 = 1, 𝐺 = 0] (𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 1] −
𝐸[𝑌|𝐿 = 1, 𝑇 = 1, 𝐺 = 0]).
Each of these differences captures the mean effect of a counterfactual experiment conducted in
group 1 that changes the respective distribution of the component to their corresponding
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counterpart in group 0 while holding everything else constant. For example, ∆𝐿 answers the
counterfactual question of how average SNAP benefit levels would change if group 1 were to
have the same eligibility rates as group 0 while maintaining fixed the likelihood of participating
in the program and also the average level of transfers that they are entitled to. Similarly, ∆ 𝑇
answers the counterfactual question of how average SNAP benefit levels would change if, on top
of having the same eligibility rates as group 0, we also were to apply the same likelihood of
participating in the program as households in group 0. Finally, the term ∆𝐺 answers the question
of how average SNAP benefit levels would change if, on top of having the same eligibility rates
and participation rates as group 0, we were to entitle households in group 1 to the same levels of
average benefits that households in group 0 are entitled to. These three components, differences
in eligibility rates, participation rates, and average benefit levels by construction add to the
overall difference between groups. In this sense, this decomposition exercise is completely
atheoretical.

2.3.4 Linkage to Differential Exposure to Food Insecurity
So far, we undertake a close to mechanical exercise to understand the average difference
in SNAP benefit levels between groups. The limitation of this approach is that the outcome of
interest is a deterministic function of household characteristics. Moreover, policy makers are
ultimately interested in differences in food consumption and food insecurity exposure.
Differences in SNAP benefits across groups are only of interest to the extent that these
differences can trace out the differences in food consumption and food insecurity exposure. In
this section, we argue that the decomposition exercise above can help inform policy makers
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about the outcomes that are of interest, such as food consumption, even if the object of the
decomposition is limited to SNAP benefits.
Assume that food consumption (𝐶) is related to SNAP benefits and other household
characteristics according to the following equation:
𝐶𝑖𝑔 = 𝛽𝑖𝑔 𝑌𝑖𝑔 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔 .
This equation states that food consumption is a function of household characteristics (𝑋𝑖𝑔 ), the
level of SNAP benefits that a household receives (𝑌𝑖𝑔 ), and their propensity to consume out of
SNAP benefits (𝛽𝑖𝑔 ), which we allow to vary across households and groups.
Under the assumption that the error term is mean independent of the observed
characteristics in the regression, taking the differences of average food consumption levels
across groups and adding and subtracting a couple of terms, we obtain:
∆𝐸[𝐶] = 𝛽1 ∆𝐸[𝑌] + ∆𝛽𝐸[𝑌0 ] + 𝜃∆𝑋 + ∆𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛽, Y).
This equation looks almost identical to the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, except for
the last term. The last term accounts for the potential differences in the covariance between the
propensity to consume out of SNAP benefits and the benefit levels themselves between groups.
This term can be safely ignored if (1) 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛽𝑖 , 𝑌𝑖 ) is zero for both groups, which must happen if
SNAP benefits are constant, (2) propensity to consume out of SNAP is constant among members
of the same group, (3) these covariances are the same regardless of group membership, or (4) 𝛽𝑖
and 𝑌𝑖 are independent.25
Under the assumption that the last term is zero, group differences in SNAP benefit levels
that we decompose before will affect differences in food consumption through a factor of

25

It is possible that 𝛽𝑖 is decreasing with 𝑌𝑖 ; i.e., MPCF out of SNAP is low when the benefit level is high. We can
still take care of this case by estimating the covariance between 𝛽𝑖 and 𝑌𝑖 .
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proportionality given by the marginal propensity to consume food (MPCF) out of SNAP
benefits, which is a parameter that has been the object of study in the previous literature. In
particular, the relative importance of differences in eligibility, take-up, and generosity obtained
by our decomposition must remain the same regardless of whether we are looking at SNAP
benefit levels or food consumption outcomes.
Previous studies have examined what proportion of SNAP receipts are infra-marginal.
For instance, Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) find that the MPCF out of food stamps is 0.16
for all non-elderly and 0.30 for female-headed households; Bruich (2014) suggests that the
MPCF out of food stamps is 0.3; Hastings and Shapiro (2018) use administrative data and casual
inference approaches and show that the MPCF out of SNAP benefits is 0.5 to 0.6, which is larger
than the MPCF out of cash. In Section 5, we use the result from Hastings and Shapiro (2018), as
it is the most recent and reliable study, to link our decomposition results of differences in SNAP
benefit levels to differences in food consumption.26

2.4 Data
We analyze data from the December Current Population Survey (CPS) between 2003 and
2016, along with the Food Security Supplement (FSS). These data are nationally representative
of the U.S. population and include sufficient information on household characteristics that allow
us to conduct the decomposition analysis. The unit of observation for the analysis is at the
household level. Households are included in the sample if the reference person is above 15 years
old. We focus on households with incomes below 185 percent of the poverty line or that report
being short of money for food. These are the target population being asked about food insecurity

26

It is worth noting that different groups might have different levels of MPCF out of SNAP benefits. We assume that
they are the same across groups in this paper.
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questions and SNAP participation in the FSS. It is important to note that his target population is
more economically disadvantaged and more food-insecure than the general population.
Since SNAP eligibility information is not available in the CPS, we impute program
eligibility for each household using the data on household income and family composition. To
obtain adequate information on earnings, we read in the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files in
January-March each year and match the December data to the appropriate ORG.27 The match
may fail because of identifier errors (due to migration, mortality, non-response, and recording
errors), inconsistencies in respondents’ basic demographic attributes (race, age, or gender), or
incomplete information on the key variables. Overall, a total of 160,065 respondents within the
scope of our study have complete information on earnings and family income after matching the
FSS to the ORG.
We collect the eligibility standards every year from the USDA to impute SNAP
eligibility for our sample with the following five steps. First, we use information on weekly
earnings to pass through the gross and net monthly income tests. Second, the categorical family
income variable is used to further screen out certain ineligible households. Third, we employ
different income eligibility standards for disabled and elderly (age 60 or older) respondents.
Fourth, we rule out immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for less than five years as they are
ineligible. Fifth, households are eligible if they reported participating in SNAP.28 Note that the
December CPS-FSS does not track all of the information needed to identify eligible households.
For instance, we lack information on households’ assets, expenses related to medical and shelter

27

For respondents in the December CPS, the ORG is split into December-March CPS surveys. We use CPS identifiers
to match households across survey months of January-March.
28
Among our imputed ineligible households, 6.68 percent (10,698 out of 160,065) of them are shown participating in
SNAP, which could be due to misreporting or the lack of information to identify eligibility. We thus consider these
households as eligible.
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deductions, SSI and TANF receipt, and whether there is a disabled or elderly member in the
household other than the respondent. We assume that all types of income other than self-reported
earnings and family income are zero.
Our imputed eligibility seems fairly reasonable. Compared to those documented in the
USDA reports (e.g., Wolkwitz, 2008; Cunnyngham, 2018), the take-up rates (see Figure 2.2)
have similar trends across demographic groups and over time periods. The program shows a
countercyclical pattern, increasing in take-up rates notably in the Great Recession. The reduction
in take-up rates after 2013 is consistent with the fact that, in November 2013, all SNAP benefits
were reduced when temporary increases in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
expired. In addition, the take-up rates are much lower for eligible elderly adults (age 60 or older)
than their counterparts. However, the take-up rates vary substantially across studies, which is
mainly due to different data, methodology, and analysis samples used.29
Since information on SNAP benefit receipt is available in the December CPS, we can
further impute the amount of benefits for those who participate in SNAP using the annual benefit
standards from the USDA. Our analysis is based on the imputed benefit levels since there are
several major problems with the self-reported SNAP benefits in the CPS. First, the self-reported
values seem to have a rounding problem. There are clear spikes in the density at benefit amounts
divisible by 100. Second, the SNAP benefits are top-coded in the CPS (the top code is $450
before 2011 and $700 in 2011 and after). Third, there are a number of participants refused, didn’t
know, or didn’t response their SNAP benefit amounts.
29

Our estimated participation rates lie between those in Cunnyngham (2018) and Gundersen et al. (2018). The
USDA reports collect administrative data from the SNAP Quality Control data to get information on SNAP
participation, along with the data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement to generate SNAP
eligibility (e.g., Cunnyngham, 2018). Compared with their estimates, our take-up rates seem to be low, but the
pattern is pretty similar. Previous studies have pointed out that SNAP participation is somewhat underreported in
survey data (Gundersen and Kreider, 2008; Cunnyngham, 2018). In addition, the USDA sample is different from our
sample.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3 describes the summary statistics for the analysis sample by race and ethnicity.
As shown in Panel A, whites have substantially higher monthly earnings and family income than
blacks and Hispanics on average. Using whites as the reference group, blacks have higher
proportions of females and immigrants, and they are less likely to be married and more likely to
be unemployed and live in metropolitan areas. On the other hand, Hispanics have higher
proportions of males and immigrants, and they are more likely to be married, unemployed, and
live in metropolitan areas. Both blacks and Hispanics have larger family size with more own
children than whites. In terms of educational attainment, blacks and Hispanics have less years of
schooling relative to whites. There are also some geographical variation across groups. Blacks
are more likely to live in the Midwest, Middle Atlantic, and South Atlantic regions, whereas
Hispanics are more likely to live in the West and West South Central regions.
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of the three SNAP components by subgroup.
Among the analysis sample, blacks and Hispanics are substantially more likely to be eligible for
SNAP. The proportions of households that are eligible are 23 percent for whites and 41 percent
for both blacks and Hispanics. Among the eligible households, blacks have the highest take-up
rate (62 percent), followed by whites (49 percent) and Hispanics (42 percent). Figure 2.2 also
shows that blacks constantly have the highest take-up rate, followed by whites and Hispanics.
Conditional on participation, Hispanics receive the highest amount of SNAP benefits on average
(404 dollars per month). Blacks receive an average benefit level of 334 dollars per month, which
is also significantly higher than the amount that whites receive (314 dollars per month).
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Panel C displays the descriptive statistics of food-related outcomes by subgroup. With
respect to food consumption, blacks spend significantly smaller amounts on food than whites,
whereas Hispanics spend more than whites. With respect to food insecurity exposure, we look at
two measures of food-related hardship as in Flores-Lagunes et al. (2018): incidence, the binary
measure which captures whether households are food insecure; and severity, based on a
continuous measure, the Rasch scale score, in the FSS. The results indicate that blacks and
Hispanics suffer from food insecurity more than whites. The outcomes are similar to our
previous study, except for the difference in the Rasch score between Hispanics and whites, which
may be due to different sample used in the two analyses.

2.5.2 Decomposition Results
Table 2.4 presents the results of our decomposition and potential outcomes of changes in
the SNAP policy rules. Row by row, we report estimates of the overall difference (∆𝑌 ) and the
contributions from the eligibility (∆𝐿 ), participation (∆ 𝑇 ), and generosity (∆𝐺 ) components. For
the decomposition by race and ethnicity, we regard non-Hispanic whites as the reference group.
We first consider the estimates from the main decomposition specified in section 3. Column (1)
shows that blacks and Hispanics overall receive 32.73 and 37.48 dollars more than whites from
the SNAP program per month, respectively. Using the estimated results of the MPCF out of
SNAP benefits from Hastings and Shapiro (2018), SNAP increases food consumption by 16.37
to 19.64 dollars per month for blacks, and by 18.74 to 22.49 dollars per month for Hispanics,
compared to whites. Differences in the proportion of being eligible alone can explain a
substantial part of the overall differences in the mean benefits for both black-white and Hispanicwhite differentials. In addition, differences in take-up rates lead to upward shift of the benefit
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levels and food consumption for blacks, but it has little impact for Hispanics. In contrast, the
generosity component increases Hispanics’ benefit level, but it is negligible for blacks.
To understand the magnitude of these differences in reducing food insecurity
differentials, we use information on the reported resource gap to assess perceived food assistance
shortcomings. There are two questions we use to capture the resource gap in the FSS: (1) how
much additional money needed to meet weekly basic household food needs; (2) how much less
money could be spent and still meet basic household food needs. Combining these two, we
create a variable that measures the amount deviating from a default level of food spending to be
food secure. Consistent with the food insecurity differentials, the average resource gaps are
larger for blacks and Hispanics relative to whites, and both of the differences in average resource
gaps are substantial. Black households reported having 89.97 dollars less per month than white
households, and Hispanic households reported having 58.12 dollars less per month. Together
with the decomposition results, SNAP reduces the food consumption gaps between
blacks/Hispanics and whites by a modest amount, which is likely not enough to reduce the
differences in the resource gaps between groups. However, it is important to note that there are
two major caveats of this measure. First, there are a lot of missing values in the two variables
used to crease the resource gap measure. Second, these self-reported amounts are subject to
personal interpretation and potential mismeasurement.
In order to shed light on the extent to which SNAP may affect differences in transfer
amounts across demographic groups, we then consider three scenarios that vary SNAP policy
rules, similar to Section 3.2. The first scenario provides every participant the same amount of
SNAP benefits, 250 dollars per month. The second scenario involves automatic enrollment, that
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is, all eligible households automatically enroll in the SNAP program. The third scenario is
universal eligibility, which let all households become eligible for SNAP.
As seen in Table 2.4, the most effective way to reduce differences in food insecurity
through SNAP is the automatic enrollment policy. Under this scenario, the SNAP benefit levels
increase the most for both blacks and Hispanics relative to whites. Without the effect of
differences in take-up rates, the eligibility component largely increases the benefit levels for
more disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, the constant transfer policy slightly increases
SNAP benefits of blacks relative to whites, but it lowers the differences in SNAP benefits
between Hispanics and whites, compared to the baseline decomposition. Universal eligibility has
little impact on the differences between blacks and whites, as well as Hispanics and whites. If
anything, it slightly decreases the black-white differential but increases the Hispanic-white
differential. Since the relative importance of the three components on differences in benefit
levels are indicative of their relative importance on differences in food consumption, we would
expect that the automatic enrollment policy is the most effective in alleviating differences in food
consumption and exposure to food insecurity.

2.6 Conclusion
Food insecurity varies greatly by race and ethnicity, and the disparities in food insecurity
have been a persistent problem in the U.S. This study attempts to uncover the pathways through
which SNAP may have on the existing heterogeneity in exposure to food insecurity. We develop
a sequential framework that decomposes differences in SNAP benefit levels across racial/ethnic
groups into three components: differences in eligibility, participation, and generosity. We then
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link the results to differences in food consumption through the MPCF out of SNAP benefits to
provide implications on food insecurity differentials.
Our results suggest that differences in eligibility attribute to a substantial part of the
overall difference in SNAP benefit levels for both black-white and Hispanic-white differentials.
On the other hand, differences in participation increase the benefit levels for blacks but have
little impact for Hispanics. The generosity component is in reverse. It increases Hispanics’
benefit levels but is negligible for blacks. Combining our results with the estimated MPCF out of
SNAP benefits in Hastings and Shapiro (2018), SNAP reduces the differences in food
consumption between blacks/Hispanics and whites by a modest amount, which is likely not
enough to reduce the differences in the resource gaps between groups. To investigate potential
effects of changes in SNAP policy rules on differences in benefit levels, we then carry out
policy-relevant counterfactual analysis. Among the three policies under consideration, we find
that automatic enrollment may be the most effective in alleviating differences in exposure to
food insecurity across racial and ethnic groups. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining
SNAP eligibility and increasing program take-up are critical for disadvantaged populations.
There are several future directions to take this work. First, the exploratory analysis carves
out the contours of the problem, and subsequent studies can investigate the effects of more
realistic policies. For instance, our model can be used to study the effects of the controversial
policy proposal that raises work requirements for SNAP beneficiaries. Since this policy is likely
to overwhelmingly hurt the poor who seek hunger relief through SNAP, it would be useful to
know to what extent and through which pathways it may exacerbate inequality in food
insecurity. In addition, there are a variety of state-based program policies that are worth
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exploring.30 Our model can help investigate which policy levers can reduce the disparities more
effectively. Second, future research can look at other dimensions of inequality in food insecurity
exposure. For instance, Coleman-Jensen et al. (2018) finds that rates of food insecurity are
substantially higher for certain populations, such as single-headed households with children and
households located in South Census Region. Also, Cunnyngham (2018) shows that take-up of
SNAP is disproportionately low among the elderly; in 2016, only 45 percent of eligible elderly
enrolled in SNAP, compared to 85 percent overall. In the presence of potential behavioral biases,
understanding how government programs mitigate the consequences of food insecurity and
evaluating the welfare impact of various interventions can help policy makers orient policies
more effectively and, ultimately, alleviate social and economic inequality.

30

One example can be examining the dynamic nature of State operational policies on Broad-Based Categorical
Eligibility (BBCE).
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Figure 2.1: Food Insecurity by Race/Ethnicity, 2003-2017
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Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.

Figure 2.2: SNAP Participation Rates, 2003-2014
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Table 2.1: Setup of the Numerical Example of the SNAP Decomposition
𝑃𝑟(𝐿𝑔 = 1)

𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑔 = 1|𝐿𝑔 = 1)

𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑔 = 1|𝐿𝑔 = 1, 𝑇𝑔 = 1)

𝑔 = 1 (blacks)

0.5

0.5

0.3

𝑔 = 0 (whites)

0.3

0.6

0.25

Table 2.2: Results of the Numerical Example of SNAP Decomposition
Baseline
(1)

Constant Transfer
(2)

Auto Enrollment
(3)

Universal Eligibility
(4)

25

35

68.75

-25

Eligibility

32.5

50

65

0

Participation

-9.75

-15

0

-32.5

Generosity

2.25

0

3.75

7.5

Overall difference
Decomposition:
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics by Race and Ethnicity
A. Socioeconomic Characteristics

Monthly Earnings
Age
Male
Immigrant
Married
Unemployed
Household Head
Number of Own
Children
Family Size
Metropolitan Area

White, nonHispanic

Black, nonHispanic

Hispanic

Difference:
Black-White

Difference:
Hispanic-White

2311.088
(5.984)
38.006
(0.046)
0.480
(0.002)
0.037
(0.001)
0.473
(0.002)
0.031
(0.001)
0.519
(0.002)
0.923
(0.004)
2.962
(0.005)
0.698
(0.002)

2031.322
(11.459)
37.902
(0.101)
0.402
(0.004)
0.116
(0.002)
0.317
(0.004)
0.047
(0.002)
0.581
(0.004)
1.062
(0.010)
3.132
(0.013)
0.858
(0.003)

1861.316
(8.195)
35.121
(0.075)
0.549
(0.003)
0.569
(0.003)
0.500
(0.003)
0.040
(0.001)
0.456
(0.003)
1.277
(0.008)
3.845
(0.012)
0.888
(0.002)

-279.766***
(14.616)
-0.104
(0.115)
-0.078***
(0.004)
0.079***
(0.003)
-0.156***
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.002)
0.062***
(0.004)
0.139***
(0.010)
0.170***
(0.013)
0.159***
(0.003)

-449.772***
(12.076)
-2.885***
(0.096)
0.069***
(0.004)
0.532***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.004)
0.009***
(0.001)
-0.063***
(0.004)
0.354***
(0.009)
0.883***
(0.012)
0.189***
(0.002)

0.112
(0.001)
0.348
(0.002)
0.334
(0.002)
0.152
(0.001)
0.053
(0.001)

0.152
(0.003)
0.378
(0.004)
0.329
(0.004)
0.101
(0.002)
0.039
(0.001)

0.401
(0.003)
0.316
(0.003)
0.207
(0.003)
0.061
(0.001)
0.015
(0.001)

0.040***
(0.003)
0.029***
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.050***
(0.003)
-0.014***
(0.002)

0.288***
(0.003)
-0.032***
(0.003)
-0.127***
(0.003)
-0.091***
(0.002)
-0.038***
(0.001)

0.075
(0.001)
0.146
(0.001)
0.187
(0.001)
0.152
(0.001)

0.135
(0.003)
0.202
(0.003)
0.214
(0.003)
0.150
(0.003)

0.092
(0.002)
0.205
(0.003)
0.236
(0.003)
0.189
(0.002)

0.060***
(0.003)
0.055***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)

0.018***
(0.002)
0.059***
(0.003)
0.049***
(0.003)
0.037***
(0.003)

Education
12 grades or less
High school degree
Some college or
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree or
above
Family Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $39,999
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$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more

0.106
(0.001)
0.085
(0.001)
0.090
(0.001)
0.078
(0.001)
0.048
(0.001)
0.017
(0.000)

0.084
(0.002)
0.061
(0.002)
0.060
(0.002)
0.039
(0.001)
0.026
(0.001)
0.009
(0.001)

0.100
(0.002)
0.060
(0.001)
0.048
(0.001)
0.035
(0.001)
0.018
(0.001)
0.005
(0.000)

-0.022***
(0.002)
-0.024***
(0.002)
-0.030***
(0.0020
-0.039***
(0.002)
-0.022***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)

-0.006***
(0.002)
-0.025***
(0.002)
-0.041***
(0.002)
-0.043***
(0.001)
-0.030***
(0.001)
-0.011***
(0.001)

0.120
(0.001)
0.076
(0.001)
0.136
(0.001)
0.166
(0.001)
0.141
(0.001)
0.060
(0.001)
0.077
(0.001)
0.129
(0.001)
0.094
(0.001)

0.037
(0.001)
0.087
(0.002)
0.114
(0.002)
0.063
(0.002)
0.374
(0.004)
0.103
(0.002)
0.139
(0.003)
0.031
(0.001)
0.051
(0.002)

0.042
(0.001)
0.075
(0.002)
0.060
(0.001)
0.050
(0.001)
0.137
(0.002)
0.013
(0.001)
0.184
(0.002)
0.165
(0.002)
0.275
(0.003)

-0.084***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.002)
-0.021***
(0.003)
-0.103***
(0.002)
0.234***
(0.004)
0.043***
(0.002)
0.062***
(0.003)
-0.098***
(0.002)
-0.043***
(0.002)

-0.079***
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.076***
(0.002)
-0.116***
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.002)
-0.047***
(0.001)
0.107***
(0.003)
0.036***
(0.003)
0.181***
(0.003)

90,924

17,255

25,662

Census Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Observations
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B. SNAP Components
White

Black

Hispanic

Difference:
Black-White

Difference:
Hispanic-White

0.234
(0.001)

0.410
(0.004)

0.411
(0.003)

0.176***
(0.004)

0.177***
(0.003)

0.487
(0.003)

0.617
(0.006)

0.424
(0.005)

0.130***
(0.007)

-0.063***
(0.006)

Benefits (self-reported)

257.738
(1.580)

260.137
(2.393)

272.719
(2.324)

2.399
(2.894)

14.982***
(2.850)

Benefits (imputed)

314.172
(2.562)

334.005
(4.080)

404.200
(4.178)

19.832***
(4.718)

90.028***
(4.680)

Eligibility
Conditional on eligibility
Take-up
Conditional on take-up

Cash-on-hand for food relative to basic food needs
Total food cash

1.260
(0.149)

-21.232
(0.434)

-13.269
(0.328)

-22.492***
(0.394)

-14.529***
(0.331)

Food cash without SNAP
benefits

-25.981
(0.371)

-83.526
(1.196)

-58.403
(0.863)

-57.545***
(1.006)

-32.422***
(0.837)

White

Black

Hispanic

Difference:
Black-White

Difference:
Hispanic-White

Total expenditures on
food last week

135.310
(0.331)

118.253
(0.779)

140.004
(0.649)

-17.058***
(0.837)

4.694***
(0.714)

Usual expenditures on
food per week

120.280
(0.265)

108.271
(0.638)

130.322
(0.554)

-12.009***
(0.672)

10.041***
(0.580)

0.259
(0.001)

0.383
(0.004)

0.353
(0.003)

0.124***
(0.004)

0.094***
(0.003)

C. Food-related Outcomes

Food consumption

Food insecurity
Binary indicator

4.221
4.519
4.271
0.297***
0.050**
(0.012)
(0.024)
(0.019)
(0.027)
(0.023)
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the analysis samples in the CPS-FSS
between 2003 and 2016. We focus on households with incomes below 185 percent of the poverty line or that report
being short of money for food (the target population of the FSS).
Rasch score
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Table 2.4: Estimated Results of the SNAP Decomposition
Baseline
(1)

Constant Transfer
(2)

Auto Enrollment
(3)

Universal Eligibility
(4)

32.733

35.362

51.392

31.730

Eligibility

26.315

21.992

68.584

0

Participation

8.072

13.370

0

-1.861

Generosity

-1.654

0

-17.192

33.592

37.477

16.238

88.443

39.447

Eligibility

27.760

11.694

88.615

0

Participation

2.229

4.544

0

-41.379

Generosity

7.487

0

-0.171

80.826

A. Black-White
Overall difference
Decomposition:

B. Hispanic-White
Overall difference
Decomposition:
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3.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, income inequality has increased in most countries, and over the same
time period, trade liberalization has taken place rapidly. A natural question is whether trade
liberalization leads to the rising inequality. According to the Stolper-Samuelson (S-S) theorem
(Stolper and Samuelson, 1941), international trade raises the relative wage of skilled workers and
deteriorates income inequality in developed countries, whereas it increases the relative wage of
unskilled workers and improves income inequality in developing countries. However, the
estimation results are mixed either using a cross-country model (e.g., Savvides, 1998; Barro,
2000; Reuvny and Li, 2003; Milanovic, 2005; IMF, 2007; Dreher and Gaoton, 2008) or an
individual country model (e.g., Beyer et al., 1999; Chen and Hsu, 2001; Galiani and Sanguinetti,
2003; Mah, 2003; Herault, 2007; Kumar and Mishra, 2008; Sato and Fukushige, 2009; Mcnabb
and Said, 2013; Lai et al., 2019), and thus the S-S theorem does not seem to be supported by
empirical evidence.
Rather than trade liberalization, some studies show that domestic reforms (such as
technological progress and financial liberalization) might be the main driving force of income
inequality, particularly in developing countries (e.g., Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; IMF, 2007).
Previous research has explored the effects of economic freedom on income inequality using a
cross-country model, where economic freedom can be measured by a composite index
constructed with many policy components, such as international trade, government regulations,
and taxation (Berggren, 1999; Carter, 2006). However, these empirical results are also unclear
(e.g., Berggren, 1999; Scully, 2002; Carter, 2006; Bergh and Nilsson, 2010). It is worth noting
that the findings using a cross-country model may not be applicable to an individual country.
Furthermore, using the composite index to measure economic freedom cannot reveal the impact
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of a specific policy on income inequality (Carter, 2006). Thus, a more thorough policy analysis
in an individual country setting is needed.
This paper aims to estimate the effects of trade liberalization on household income
inequality and to investigate whether trade liberalization or domestic reforms are the leading
factors of the rising inequality since 1980 in Taiwan. Following the globalization trends, Taiwan
adopted trade liberalization policy in the early 1980s. Since then, the degree of trade openness
(the share of exports plus imports to GDP) has substantially increased from an average of 85.4%
in the 1980s to above 100% after the 2000s. Trade expansion has led to economic growth in
Taiwan. For example, the average income per capita was only US$4,129.9 in the 1980s, but it
exceeded US$20,000 in 2011 and reached US$23,131 in 2015.31 On the other hand, household
income inequality has also increased over time. For example, the quintile ratio of household
disposable income, which is the relative disposable income of the highest 20% to the lowest 20%
income households, rose from 4.2 in 1980 to above 6.0 after 2001.
In addition to external trade liberalization, the Taiwanese government has implemented
various domestic reforms since 1980. We focus on four of the reforms that may influence income
inequality: (i) financial liberalization in the 1980s and two financial reforms in the 2000s; (ii) the
expansion of higher education since 1985; (iii) the amendments to industrial development
policies that encourage investment in capital assets and research and development (R&D); (iv)
large increases in social welfare and social insurance expenditures since the 1990s. The goals of
these reforms were to attain a better functioning economy, to stimulate economic growth, or to
meet political needs. Nevertheless, they may also have affected income inequality and had a

31

National Development Council, R.O.C. (Taiwan), Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2016.
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larger impact than trade liberalization (Behrman et al., 2003; IMF, 2007; Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2007).
Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, previous studies using a cross-country
model all dichotomize the countries of interest into developed and developing countries.
However, many economies, such as Taiwan and some OECD countries (e.g., Mexico, Turkey,
Chile, Latvia, Greece, Poland, and Hungary), should be considered as a middle-income open
economy (MIOE). They simultaneously trade with both more- and less-developed countries, and
the trade effects from one side may offset the other, resulting in a small or even insignificant
overall effect on income inequality. Compared to many advanced OECD countries, Taiwan is a
MIOE in terms of its income per capita.32 Departing from the conventional approach, Chen and
Hsu (2001) regard Taiwan as a MIOE and separately estimate the effects of net exports to OECD
countries and those to non-OECD countries on wage differentials in Taiwan. To provide a
complete picture of the trade effects on inequality in a MIOE, we also distinguish the effects of
net exports between OECD and non-OECD countries.
We use the quintile ratio of household disposable income to measure income inequality.
To assess the effects of trade liberalization and domestic reforms on inequality, we construct an
empirical model based on decomposition of the sources of household disposable income in the
quintile ratio to capture possible influence factors. The model includes factors of trade
liberalization and domestic reforms as explanatory variables, and thus it allows us to analyze the
relative importance of each factor.

32

The income per capita in terms of 2015 US dollars is 23,131 in Taiwan, which is substantially smaller than some
OECD countries, such as the US (56,070), Germany (45,780), United Kingdom (43,700), France (40,530), and
Japan (38,780), according to Taiwan Statistical Data Book (2016) and World Development Indicators, World Bank.
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Using time-series data from 1980 to 2015, we conduct a cointegration test to estimate the
effects of various influence factors on income inequality. Our main findings are as follows. First,
net exports to OECD countries significantly increase inequality, whereas net exports to nonOECD countries insignificantly decrease inequality. Overall, trade liberalization increases
inequality in Taiwan. Second, among domestic reforms, government expenditures on social
welfare and social insurance reduce inequality. On the other hand, technological progress biased
toward skilled labor, industrial structural change, and financial market reforms increase
inequality. Third, by calculating the long-run mean impacts to evaluate the contribution of each
influence factor, we find that technological progress and industrial structural change are the main
driving forces of the rising inequality in Taiwan.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we jointly estimate the
impacts of trade liberalization and domestic reforms in an attempt to explain the rising trend in
income inequality in Taiwan. This approach better identifies the influence factors of income
inequality in an individual country setting. Second, we investigate the case of Taiwan to provide
some empirical evidence on the effects of trade with more- and less-developed countries in a
MIOE. Third, we construct an empirical model to assess possible influence factors of household
income inequality, and this framework can be applied to other studies on inequality. Fourth, our
results provide policy implications for some countries, particularly developing countries, which
endeavor in various reforms to promote economic growth but at the same time suffer from the
deterioration of income distribution.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the findings in the literature.
Section 3 provides background on income inequality, policy changes in trade liberalization, and
domestic reforms in Taiwan. Section 4 demonstrates the empirical model based on quintile ratio
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decomposition, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the
implications of these results.

3.2 Literature Review
The two main theories used in the literature to study the effects of international trade on
income distribution are the H-O theory and the S-S theorem. According to the H-O theory and
following the comparative advantage principle, developed countries, which are relatively
abundant in skilled labor, export skilled-labor-intensive products to developing countries and
import unskilled-labor-intensive products from them. On the other hand, developing countries,
which are relatively abundant in unskilled labor, export unskilled-labor-intensive products to
developed countries and import skilled-labor-intensive products from them. By the S-S theorem,
an expansion in net exports in a developed (developing) country increases the relative demand
for skilled (unskilled) labor, which increases (decreases) the relative wage of skilled labor. This
in turn causes income inequality to rise (fall) in a developed (developing) country, ceteris
paribus.
A number of studies have estimated the effects of trade liberalization on income
inequality, but the results are mixed, with some being inconsistent with the prediction of the S-S
theorem. For instance, using a cross-country model, Barro (2000) and Milanovic (2005) find that
trade openness decreases inequality in high-income countries but increases inequality in lowincome countries. Savvides (1998) shows that trade openness raises inequality in less-developed
countries, while the effect is statistically insignificant in developed countries. Reuveny and Li
(2003) and IMF (2007) demonstrate that economic globalization improves inequality in both
developed and developing countries. In addition to economic globalization, Dreher and Gaoton

90

(2008) also consider social and political globalization. They find that globalization exacerbates
inequality, particularly in OECD countries, but there is no consistent effect in less-developed
countries.
The empirical results using an individual country model are also mixed. Wood (1997)
finds that trade opening in the 1960s and 1970s in East Asian countries decreases wage
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers, but trade opening in the 1980s in Latin
American countries increases wage differentials. Several studies also show that trade openness
widens wage differentials in Latin American countries, e.g., Chile (Beyer et al., 1999), Mexico
(Hanson and Harrison, 1999), and Argentina (Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003). In terms of Asian
countries, Mah (2003) finds that trade liberalization does not have a significant impact on
income inequality in Korea, but Sato and Fukushige (2009) show that economic globalization
reduces income inequality in Korea in both the short run and the long run. Kumar and Mishra
(2008) investigate the 1991 trade liberalization reforms in India, and Mcnabb and Said (2013)
examine trade liberalization policy since the mid-1980s in Malaysia. Both studies find that trade
liberalization decreases wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. As pointed out
by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), there is limited evidence that supports the conventional S-S
theorem based on previous studies on the trade effects in developing countries.
In the case of Taiwan, Chan et al. (1999) find a positive and significant effect of net
exports on wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor. When distinguishing the
effects among trade partners, Chen and Hsu (2001) show that net exports to OECD countries
increase wage differentials, whereas net exports to non-OECD countries decrease wage
differentials. On the other hand, Lai et al. (2019) suggest that trade openness leads to a decrease
in income inequality overall.
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Regarding the effects of economic liberalization policies on income inequality, the
empirical results are also inconclusive. Using a cross-country model and a composite index to
measure economic freedom, Berggren (1999) finds a positive relationship between economic
freedom and equality, which is mainly attributed to trade liberalization and financial
deregulation. Scully (2002) also shows that economic freedom promotes income inequality. In
contrast, Carter (2006) and Bergh and Nilsson (2010) suggest that economic freedom increases
inequality, especially in rich countries. Behrman et al. (2003) investigate the effects of six
economic policy changes on wage differentials in 18 Latin American countries and find that
liberalization policy changes together have a disequalizing effect in the short run. This is due to
the impact of financial market reform, capital account liberalization, and tax reform; however,
trade openness has no significant effect on wage differentials. As mentioned earlier, the results of
a cross-country model may not be applicable to an individual country, and the usage of the
composite index to measure economic freedom cannot reveal the effect of a specific reform on
inequality.
There are several reasons why the effects of trade on income inequality are inconsistent
or statistically insignificant in the literature. First, previous studies do not distinguish the trade
effects between different types of trade partners. In fact, many countries are MIOEs trading with
both developed and developing countries, and the effects from one side may conflict and offset
the other, resulting in a small or even insignificant total effect on income inequality. Since
Taiwan is a MIOE, we split Taiwan’s trade partners into OECD and non-OECD countries and
separately estimate their effects on income inequality, similar to Chen and Hsu (2001). Second,
the mixed results could be due to differences in the selection of domestic (control) variables.
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Nevertheless, there is no standard empirical model from which domestic variables could be
drawn (Carter, 2006).
For the purpose of this study, we decompose the quintile ratio based on the sources of
household disposable income to directly capture possible influence factors of inequality. Instead
of using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, as most of the literature does, we conduct a
cointegration test to estimate the long-run effects of the influence factors on income inequality.
Since trade liberalization and domestic reforms gradually take place, the effects on inequality
take time to develop and may persist for a long period of time. It is more applicable to estimate
the long-run impact with time-series data. Moreover, from the econometric point of view, the
variables considered in our model are all integrated of degree one, I(1). Using OLS estimation
with the first-differenced values may suffer from over-differencing problem and result in biased
estimates. With the cointegration test, we can obtain reliable estimates of the long-run effects.

3.3 Income Inequality, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Reforms
3.3.1 Household Income Inequality
We use data from the Report on the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (RSFIE),
issued annually by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS),
Executive Yuan of Taiwan. The RSFIE is the only official data source of family income and
expenditure, as well as income inequality.33 There are two main indicators of income inequality
reported by the DGBAS: the quintile ratio and the Gini coefficient. As shown in Figure 3.1, these
two indicators have very similar trends. The quintile ratio was 4.17 in 1980, reached the peak of

33

The DGBAS conducts a survey each year to obtain family income and expenditure from 13,600-16,400 families
in Taiwan. This survey started from 1964, but it was carried out on a two-year basis prior to 1972. The sampling rate
is about 2-4‰ of the entire population.
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6.39 in 2001, and remained stable at around 6.10 afterwards. Similarly, the Gini coefficient was
0.28 in 1980, reached the peak of 0.35 in 2001, and then remained stable at around 0.34.
We use the quintile ratio of household disposable income to measure income inequality
since it is the most commonly used indicator in Taiwan. The quintile ratio is defined as the ratio
of disposable income of the highest 20% to the lowest 20% income households. We consider
inequality in disposable income at the household level because government transfer payments on
social welfare and social insurance in Taiwan are based on household income. As will be
discussed later, those payments are relevant to inequality through income redistribution effects.
By decomposing the sources of household disposable income in the quintile ratio, we construct
an empirical model that captures possible influence factors of income inequality.
Besides trade liberalization and domestic reforms, differences in household
characteristics may also affect income inequality. Table 3.1 shows three differences in household
characteristics between the highest 20% income (the fifth quintile) and the lowest 20% income
(the first quintile) households: the number of persons per household, the number of persons
employed per household, and the educational attainment of economic household heads. Along
with economic development and social structural change, the average number of persons per
household and the average number of persons employed per household have gradually decreased
in both the first and fifth quintiles since 1980. However, the ratio of the number of persons
employed per household of the fifth quintile to that of the first quintile has increased from 1.82 in
1980 to 5.04 in 2015. As the difference in the number of persons employed between the highestand lowest-income households becomes larger, the household income differential may also
increase, causing income inequality to rise.34

34

In Section 4, we provide more details about the influence of the number of persons employed per household on
income inequality.
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Regarding the percentage of economic household heads with a bachelor’s degree or
higher, the fifth quintile always has a higher rate than the first quintile. Typically, higher
educational attainment leads to higher earnings, and thus household income of the fifth quintile
should be higher. Nevertheless, the massive expansion in higher education in Taiwan since the
1990s has decreased the difference in educational attainment between the highest- and lowestincome households. As shown in Table 3.1, the percentages of economic household head with a
bachelor’s degree or higher in both the first and the fifth quintile households have risen rapidly,
but the ratio of the two percentages has gradually declined from 16.20 in 1980 to 7.89 in 2015.
This implies that the expansion of higher education may reduce household income inequality. In
Table 3.2, we summarize changes in trade liberalization policy and four domestic reforms in
Taiwan since the 1980s, and further discuss them in the following subsections.

3.3.2 Trade Liberalization
During the early stages of economic development, trade policy in Taiwan was associated
with foreign exchange control policy due to the shortage in foreign exchange. In the early 1980s,
Taiwan’s trade surplus substantially increased, and a large amount of foreign exchange reserves
were accumulated. As a result, the major trade partners, particularly the U.S., required Taiwan to
reduce trade barriers and appreciate the New Taiwan (NT) dollar. The Taiwanese government
subsequently implemented trade liberalization policy.
This policy includes two main components. First, it relaxed foreign exchange control in
1987 and adjusted the exchange rate system from a fixed to a managed floating system in 1989.
Second, the policy reduced the import tariff and relaxed controls on exports and imports. Since
the mid-1980s, Taiwan started to lower its import tariff rate (tariff revenues/total value of
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imports) from an average of 7.5%. In 2002, Taiwan became a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and the average tariff rate substantially declined to the current level of
around 1.5%. In addition, the bilateral trade with China has greatly expanded since the 1990s.
Taiwan allowed indirect trade with China in 1993,35 and it further allowed direct trade in 2002.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the ratio of total net exports ( NX ) to GDP ( Y ) has a humpshape. It increased from about zero to a peak of 20% in 1986 and then declined to below 5% in
the 1990s. It slightly increased again after 2010. This trend indicates that trade liberalization in
the mid-1980s led to a more rapid growth in imports than in exports. Since Taiwan is a MIOE,
we split the total net exports into net exports to OECD countries and those to non-OECD
countries. The ratio of net exports to OECD countries to GDP ( NX O / Y ) dramatically decreased
after the mid-1980s and became negative (trade deficit) after 1992. In contrast, the ratio of net
exports to non-OECD countries to GDP ( NX NO / Y ) remained positive (trade surplus) and
increased over time. The increase in NX NO / Y was relatively large in the early 1990s and 2000s,
which is mainly due to trade with China. As will be discussed later, NX O / Y and NX NO / Y
have different effects on income inequality.

3.3.3 Industrial Development Policy: Structural Change and Technological Progress
In the process of economic development, the Taiwanese government endeavored to
promote industrial development via legislation. There were three industrial statutes: (i) Statute
for the Encouragement of Investment (SEI) from 1960 to 1990, (ii) Statute for Upgrading
Industry (SUI) from 1991 to 2009, and (iii) Statute for Industrial Innovation (SII) after 2010.

35

Due to the special relationship across the Taiwan straits, Taiwanese firms were only allowed to conduct transit
trade with China through Hong Kong.
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These three statutes, the so-called “Industrial Constitution” in Taiwan, dominated industrial
investment and contributed to technological progress.
Tax encouragement was the main policy tool of these three statutes, in particular the fiveyear exemption of profit-seeking enterprises income tax for the industries or firms that met the
encouragement requirements. However, these three statutes targeted different types of industries
and firms. The earliest statute, SEI, focused on promoting capital investment of productive
industries. It implemented encouragement on specific industries and adjusted the categories of
the encouraged industries based on the stage of economic development. For example, it
increased encouragement for investment in the newly strategic industries (information,
electricity, and machinery) in the 1980s. The second statute, SUI, aimed at upgrading industries;
therefore, it changed from the previous “industry species” encouragement to “function species”
encouragement, and only a few former enterprises were still included.36 The function species
encouragement included investment expenditures in automatic equipment, R&D, and labor force
development. The encouragement applied to all enterprises, including small and medium
enterprises, and in particular the service business. The third statute, SII, was designed to enhance
industrial innovation and continue the function species encouragement. However, only R&D
expenditure remained on the list, and all the industry species encouragement was eliminated. The
SII applied to all enterprises, businesses, and inviable assets.
The tax encouragement of these three statutes led to two apparent changes in industrial
development in Taiwan. The first one includes changes in industrial structure and employment
structure. In the 1960s and 1970s, the industrial sector grew rapidly, and beginning in the 1980s

36

For example, several important technology enterprises (newly formed industries such as communication,
information, semiconductor, etc.) and the venture capital enterprise were involved in 1990, but only the newly
strategic industries remained in 2000.
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it moved toward high-technology manufacture. After the late 1980s, the service sector began to
thrive and surpass the industrial sector. As of 2015, the share of the product value in GDP was
63.17% in the service sector and 35.13% in the industrial sector. Because the service sector
absorbed more employees, changes in industrial structure also led to structural change in the
labor market. As shown in Figure 3.3a, the number of employees in the industrial sector ( EMPIND
) was larger than that in the service sector ( EMPSER ) before 1988. Since then, EMPSER has
exceeded EMPIND , and the ratio of EMPSER / EMPIND has increased substantially. The percentage
of the number of sectoral employees to the number of total employees in 2015 was 59.02% in the
service sector and 36.03% in the industrial sector, resulting in a ratio ( EMPSER / EMPIND ) of 1.64.
Noticeably, EMPSER / EMPIND has remained stable at around 1.64 since 2002, implying that the
industrial structure and the distribution of the number of employees between these two sectors
have become stable.
The second apparent change includes rapid capital accumulation and technological
progress. The earliest SEI was helpful for accumulating capital, and the function species
encouragement of SUI and SII since 1991 stimulated R&D investment. All three statutes
enhanced industrial technology progress. Following Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Chan et al.
(1999), Chen and Hsu (2001), Mcnabb and Said (2013), and Lai et al. (2019), we use the total
factor productivity index ( TFP ) in the service and industrial sectors to measure technological
progress.37 As shown in Figure 3.3b, TFP has constantly increased since the 1980s.

37

Several measures of technological change have been used in the literature. For instance, besides the total factor
productivity ( TFP ), others also use the share of information and communication technology capital ( K ICT ) in the
total capital stock (IMF, 2007), the ratio of K ICT flow to GDP (Asteriou et al., 2014), and the ratio of expenditure on
R&D to sales (Berman et al., 1994).
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3.3.4 Reforms in Higher Education
Over the past five decades, the higher education system in Taiwan has undergone
substantial changes. In 1968, the compulsory education was extended from 6 years (primary
school) to 9 years (junior high school). According to the Education Statistics from the Ministry
of Education (MOE), the net enrollment rate of junior high school for the population aged 12-14
was 97.82% in the 2015 academic year. Traditionally, the MOE imposed strict restrictions on the
establishment of new universities and college enrollment in order to maintain the quality of
higher education. Driven by the need for more-educated workers to help economic development
and by people’s desire to attend higher education, the MOE relaxed the restrictions on
establishment of universities in 1985.38 The number of higher education institutions has begun to
increase since 1987. The total number of universities and colleges increased from 28 in 1985 to
127 in 2000 and 158 in 2015. In the 1990s, the number of people who have a bachelor’s degree
or higher also increased substantially, from 191,752 in the 1985 academic year to 647,920 in the
2000 academic year. It further increased to 1,332,245 in the 2015 academic year, in which the
net enrollment rate of universities and colleges for the population aged 18-21 was 70.86%.
We define employees aged 15 and above who have a bachelor’s degree or higher (higher
education) as skilled workers ( LSC ) and those with a junior high school degree or lower
(mandatory education) as unskilled workers ( LS M ).39 We use the ratio of LSC / LSM to represent
the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. As shown in Figure 3.3c, LSC / LSM was
only 0.15 in 1980. It increased rapidly in the 1990s, and LSC began to exceed LS M in 2004, with

38

See Gindling and Sun (2002) for a detailed description of higher education planning in Taiwan.
The minimum working age is 15 in Taiwan. Following Chan et al. (1999) and Lai et al. (2019), we do not consider
the employees with a senior high school degree (both general and vocational) because workers with a senior high
school degree may work in high-skilled, mid-skilled, and low-skilled occupations. We are unable to identify who are
skilled and who are unskilled labor within this group.
39
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LSC / LSM being 1.08. Since 2011, LSC / LSM has been larger than 2. Overall, the expansion of
higher education in Taiwan increased the relative supply of skilled labor since the mid-1990s.

3.3.5 Financial Market Reforms
The financial market in Taiwan was under strict control until the government adopted
liberalization and globalization policies in the 1980s. The key policy changes were (i) allowing
domestic banks to open more branches and allowing foreign banks to set branches in 1984, (ii)
liberalizing bank interest rates and allowing banks to determine their own interest rates for
deposits and loans in 1989, and (iii) approving 15 new banks to set up in 1991.40 However, these
policies resulted in violent competition among banks and deteriorated the earnings ratio and nonperforming loan ratio of banks.
To improve the financial quality of banks, the government implemented the first financial
reform in 2002 and proposed the “two-five-eight plan,” i.e., lowering the non-performing loan
ratio of banks to below 5% within two years and maintaining the capital adequacy ratio of banks
at above 8%. Since the number of existing banks was still large after the 2002 reform, the second
financial reform was implemented in 2004 in order to increase the earnings ratio by reducing the
number of banks. The main objectives were to (i) decrease the number of public-owned financial
institutions from 12 to 6 by the end of 2005 and (ii) reduce the number of financial holdings
corporations from 14 to 7 by the end of 2006. Although the number of domestic banks has
diminished, these objectives have not been completely achieved.
Following IMF (2007) and Lai et al. (2019), we measure the degree of financial
development using the ratio of credit to the private sector provided by commercial banks and

40

After that, the number of banks largely increased.
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other financial institutions ( CREDIT ) to GDP ( CREDIT / Y ). As shown in Figure 3.3d,
financial liberalization largely expanded private credit in the 1980s, but CREDIT / Y was
contracted in the mid-1990s. It then increased again after the 2002 and 2004 financial reforms.

3.3.6 Changes in Social Welfare and Social Insurance policies
The transfer payments between the government and households include three parts: taxes,
social welfare, and social insurance, which all have income redistribution effects. Before 1990,
the majority of transfer payments in Taiwan were (i) individual income tax and (ii) compulsory
social insurances for the military, government officials, teachers, workers, and farmers. As
political democratization took place in the 1990s, the President, Legislators of the central
government, and local leaders (mayors, council members, etc.) were all changed to direct
election.41 In order to win the support of voters, the major political parties in the campaigns
usually proposed to increase social welfare expenditures, causing the government expenditures to
rise. In addition, there were two compulsory social insurances implemented subsequently:
National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995 and National Pension Insurance (NPI) in 2008. Both of
them have increased government spending, particularly the premium subsidies to low-income
families.
Previous studies on the effects of taxes and transfer payments indicate that taxes have
little income redistribution effect due to the relatively stable tax system in Taiwan. On the other
hand, the large increases in social welfare and social insurance expenditures since the 1990s are
more important in terms of reducing income inequality (Jao, 2000; Cheng and Lee, 2010).
Therefore, we include the ratio of government social welfare and social insurance expenditures (
41

For example, the 1992 legislator’s election, the 1993 county mayoral election, the 1994 governor’s election, and
the 1996 presidential election.
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SWEXP ) to government budget ( GB ) ( SWEXP / GB ) as one of the influence factors of

household income inequality. As shown in Figure 3.3e, SWEXP / GB was about 4-7% in the
1980s and rose rapidly in the 1990s, exceeding 12% after the implementation of NHI in 1995
and increasing to around 20% after 2012.

3.4 Empirical Model
Based on the sources of household disposable income ( YD ), we decompose the quintile
ratio ( RYD ) to capture the influence factors of inequality and construct the empirical model to
estimate their effects on RYD .
According to the RSFIE, household disposable income includes payroll income,
entrepreneurial income, property income, net transfer income, and miscellaneous receipts. We
combine entrepreneurial income and property income as capital income, extract government net
transfer income from net transfer income,42 and let all other receipts as others. Therefore,
household disposable income ( YD ) becomes the sum of payroll income ( W ), capital income ( A
), government net transfer income ( GT ), and others, and YD can be written as follows:

YD  W  A  GT  Others .

(1)

Payroll income is the main source of household income, followed by capital income.43 Although
the share of government net transfer income is relatively small, it is included as an influence
factor due to its income redistribution. In the following analysis, we ignore other miscellaneous
receipts since they have negligible shares in household income.

42

Net transfer income includes net transfer payments from individuals, government, benefit of social insurance,
enterprises, and abroad.
43
In 2015, payroll income and capital income accounted for 56.98% and 23.38% of the total household income,
respectively.
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By definition, RYD is the relative income of the highest 20% to the lowest 20%
households. Using Eq. (1), RYD can be expressed as:

RYD 

YD H W H  AH  GT H

,
YD L W L  AL  GT L

(2)

where superscripts H and L denote the highest- and lowest-income households, respectively.

RYD in Eq. (2) can be decomposed into the following:
L
RYD  WL RW   AL RA  GT
RGT ,

(3)

where RW  W H / W L , RA  AH / AL , and RGT  GT H / GT L , representing inequalities in W , A ,
and GT between the highest- and lowest-income households, respectively;

 jL  j L / W L  AL  GT L  , where j  W , A, GT , representing the shares of W L , AL and GT L in
YD L of the lowest-income households, respectively. Using Eq. (3), we further examine the
influence factors of RW , RA , and RGT to construct our empirical model.44

3.4.1 Influence Factors of RW
Household payroll income is equal to the household average wage rate ( w ) multiplied by
the number of persons employed per household ( N ), i.e., W  w  N . RW can thus be expressed
as:
RW  W H / W L  wH / wL  N H / N L ,

44

(4)

Using a similar approach as Eq. (3), Tsaur (1996) finds that increases in RW and R A are the main sources of
household income inequality in Taiwan. However, Tsaur (1996) does not analyze the influence of government net
transfer payments on inequality ( RGT ). Changes in  jL are very small in all years so the influences on inequality are
negligible.
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where wH / wL denotes the ratio of the average wage rate of the highest-income to that of the
lowest-income households; N H / N L denotes the ratio of the number of persons employed per
household of the highest-income to that of the lowest-income households. From Eq. (4), an
increase in N H / N L or wH / wL will raise RW . Figure 3.4 shows that both N H / N L and wH / wL
have been greater than one and rising since 1980, causing RW and RYD to increase. Since
changes in N H / N L are likely to be exogenous as they are due to changes in economic and
social structure, changes in wH / wL are what needs to be explained.
wH / wL >1 in all years implies that the average quality of labor is higher among the

highest-income households. As demonstrated by Table 3.1, the highest-income households have
a higher percentage of economic household heads with a bachelor’s degree or higher than the
lowest-income households do. Since workers with a bachelor’s degree or higher are defined as
skilled labor, the employed persons in the highest-income (lowest-income) households are more
likely to be skilled (unskilled) labor. In general, the wage rate of skilled labor is higher than the
wage rate of unskilled labor; therefore, wH >wL .
In addition, the increasing trend in wH / wL implies that the wage differential between
skilled and unskilled workers ( ws / wu ) has increased over time. Changes in ws / wu depend on
changes in the relative supply of and the relative demand for skilled labor. If the increase in the
relative demand is larger than the increase in the relative supply, ws / wu will rise. We follow
Johnson (1997), Chan et al. (1999), and Chen and Hsu (2001) to specify the determination of

ws / wu .
We consider an economy in the H-O framework with two types of labor: skilled and
unskilled, where both types of labor are necessary in production. There are two types of

104

technology in production, A1 and A2 , where A1 is more skilled-labor-intensive than A2 . Given
the level of physical capital, the technology level, and the market wage rates, firm i , where i = 1
and 2, will choose the two types of labor to produce output. By minimizing firm’s labor costs, we
can obtain the conditional demands for skilled and unskilled labor. By aggregating the
economy’s conditional demands, and given the aggregate supplies of skilled and unskilled labor,
we can solve for the equilibrium wage rates for both types of labor. The equilibrium relative
wage between skilled and unskilled labor can thus be written as:
ws / wu  f  N ss / N us , A1 / A2 , Y1 / Y2  .

(5)

The above equation shows that ws / wu is determined by (i) the relative supply of skilled labor (
N ss / Nus ) and (ii) the relative demand for skilled labor, which is influenced by the relative

technology level ( A1 / A2 ) and the relative demand for skilled-labor-intensive output ( Y1 / Y2 ).
In our empirical analysis, we use LSC / LSM as a proxy for N ss / Nus to represent the
relative supply of skilled labor, and we use TFP as a proxy for A1 / A2 to reflect the domestic
technological progress bias. Regarding the relative demand for output ( Y1 / Y2 ), we use the ratio
of net exports to GDP ( NX / Y ) and the ratio of employees in the service sector to those in the
industrial sector ( EMPSER / EMPIND ) as proxies.45 The influence factors of ws / wu will affect
wH / wL , and thus the latter can be expressed as:

45

The demands for domestic products consist of domestic demands and net exports (net foreign demands). Since
domestic demands for traded goods are relatively stable, NX / Y can be used as a proxy for changes in the demand
composition, as well as changes in the relative demand for skilled labor (Chan et al., 1999; Chen and Hsu, 2001). In
addition, the increase in EMPSER / EMPIND indicates that the product value of the service sector grows faster than the
industrial sector. Since the service sector is more skilled-labor-intensive than the industrial sector, such change in
industrial structure implies an increase in the relative domestic demand for skilled-labor-intensive service products
and hence in the relative demand for skilled labor (Mincer, 1993; Chan et al., 1999).
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wH / wL  f  LSC / LSM , TFP, NX / Y , EMPSER / EMPIND  .

(6)

Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (4), the possible influence factors of RW can be written as follows:
RW  RW  LSC / LS M , TFP, NX / Y , EMPSER / EMPIND , N H / N L  .

(7)

3.4.2 Influence Factors of RA
The financial market development in a country not only stimulates economic growth but
also improves income inequality by helping the poor to increase income through financial loans
(Beck et al., 2007; Agnello et al., 2012). On the contrary, if the financial market is not well
developed, a larger share of financial flows might disproportionately accrue to those with higher
endowments and income. People who are already better-off are more able to invest in
human/physical capital and further increase their income. As a result, financial deepening may
adversely affect income inequality (IMF, 2007). Following IMF (2007), we use the ratio of

CREDIT / Y to represent the degree of financial development, which affects household capital
income. The influence factor on RA can be expressed as follows:

RA  RA  CREDIT / Y  .

(8)

3.4.3 Influence Factors of RGT
Government transfer payments lead to redistribution of household income and have a
negative relationship with income inequality (Bulir, 2001; Scully, 2002). As mentioned earlier,
the large increases in social welfare and social insurance expenditures are the main factors that
cause income redistribution and changes in RGT in Taiwan since the 1990s (Jao, 2000; Cheng
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and Lee, 2010). Thus, we include the ratio of government expenditures on social welfare and
social insurance to government budget ( SWEXP / GB ) as the influence factor of RGT :

RGT  RGT  SWEXP / GB  .46

(9)

3.4.4 Empirical Model and Expected Effects
Substituting Eqs. (7)-(9) into Eq. (3), we can obtain all the possible influence factors of

RYD . Using a linear functional form, our empirical model can be written as:
RYD   0  1 NX / Y  1TFP  2 EMPSER / EMPIND  3 LSC / LSM
  4 N H / N L  5CREDIT / Y   6 SWEXP / GB  1 ,

(10)

where 1 is the error term. For simplicity, we omit time subscript t in the equation. Based on Eq.
(10), we discuss the expected effects of each explanatory variable on RYD as follows.
According to the S-S theorem, trade liberalization ( NX / Y ) improves income inequality
in developing countries and deteriorates inequality in developed countries. However, the
empirical results of previous studies are mixed and often inconsistent with the prediction of the
S-S theorem. Moreover, since Taiwan is a MIOE, we expect an ambiguous sign for 1 .
If technological progress ( TFP ) biases toward skilled labor, i.e., the relative technology
level ( A1 / A2 ) in Eq. (5) increases, the relative wage of skilled labor and income inequality both
increase. In contrast, if TFP biases toward unskilled labor, the relative wage of skilled labor and
income inequality both decrease (Johnson, 1997). From Figure 3.3b, TFP has increased

46

Both the expenditures on social welfare and total government expenditures increase over time, with the former
growing faster than the latter.
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substantially over time in Taiwan since 1980, so 1  0 ( 1 <0 ) implies that TFP biases toward
skilled (unskilled) labor and raises (reduces) RYD .
As shown in Figure 3.3a, the change in industrial structure (i.e., the service sector
growing more rapidly than the industrial sector) results in an increase in EMPSER / EMPIND over
time. In addition, the service sector employs more skilled labor than the industrial sector (Chan
et al., 1999). These result in an increase in relative demand for skilled labor, and thus we expect
a positive effect of EMPSER / EMPIND on RYD ( 2  0 ).
Increasing prevalence in education can improve income inequality (Bourguignon, 1994;
Birdsall et al., 1995; Savvides, 1998). From Figure 3.3c, the massive expansion in higher
education since the 1990s in Taiwan contributes to a dramatic increase in the relative supply of
skilled labor ( LSC / LSM ), which reduces the relative wage of skilled labor as well as income
inequality (Chan et al., 1999; Chen and Hsu, 2001; Gindling and Sun, 2002; Vere, 2005; Lai et
al., 2019). Moreover, the expansion in higher education lowers the differential in the number of
persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher between the highest- and lowest-income households
(Table 3.1). Therefore, we expect 3 <0 .
The greater the difference in the number of persons among households, the more unequal
the household income distribution will be (Kuznets, 1981). Figure 3.4 shows that N H / N L has
steadily increased over time, although the number of persons employed per household has
gradually declined in Taiwan since 1980 (Table 3.1). We expect RW and RYD to increase and

 4 >0 .
Financial market development ( CREDIT / Y ) may improve or deteriorate income
distribution between rich and poor families (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Beck et al., 2007;
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IMF, 2007). From Figure 3.3d, the financial market reforms in Taiwan have led to a substantial
expansion in CREDIT / Y since the 1980s. If  5 >0 , the result implies that high-income
households get more advantage from the financial reforms ( RA and RYD increase); conversely, if

5 <0 , the result suggests that low-income households get more advantage ( RA and RYD
decrease).
Government transfer payments to households can improve income inequality through
redistribution effects (Bulir, 2001; Scully, 2002). Since the 1990s, Taiwanese government has
increased social welfare and social insurance expenditures, making SWEXP / GB to rise
substantially (Figure 3.3e). This results in significant income redistribution effects (Jao, 2000;
Cheng and Lee, 2010); i.e., RGT and RYD decrease. Thus, we expect  6 <0 .
As emphasized earlier, Taiwan is a MIOE trading with both OECD and non-OECD
countries. Net exports to OECD countries and to non-OECD countries may have opposite effects
on income inequality and offset each other. To account for this, we split NX / Y into NX O / Y
and NX NO / Y , and modify Eq. (10) to:

RYD  0  1O NX O / Y +1NO NX NO / Y  1TFP  2 EMPSER / EMPIND
 3 LSC / LS M   4 N H / N L  5CREDIT / Y   6 SWEXP / GB   2 , (11)

where the additional subscripts O and NO of coefficient 1 represent OECD and non-OECD
countries, respectively.
According to the S-S theorem, NX O / Y decreases RYD in a less-developed country,
whereas NX NO / Y increases RYD in a more-developed country. Coefficients 1O and 1NO are
expected to be negative and positive, respectively. On the other hand, trading with developed
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countries may lead to technology transfer to a less-developed country (e.g., Lau and Wan, 1991).
Learning new technology requires skilled labor, so net exports to OECD countries may increase
the demand for skilled labor and raise RYD in a MIOE. At the same time, commodities produced
and exported to non-OECD countries require more unskilled labor. Trading with non-OECD
countries may decrease RYD , In this case, we expect 1O to be positive and 1NO to be negative.
Overall, the signs of 1O and 1NO depend on whether the effect via comparative advantage or
the effect via technology transfer dominates.

3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Data, Unit Root Test, and Methodology
We use time-series data from 1980 to 2015 for our empirical analysis. Table 3.A1 in
Appendix B summarizes the variables used, their definitions, data sources, and summary
statistics.47 We first conduct unit root tests with drift (   ) on all the variables, using the ADF test
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the PP test (Phillips and Perron, 1988). Table 3.3 shows that all
variables (except for LSC / LSM ) contain a unit root, I(1).48 For LSC / LSM , both tests indicate
that it is integrated of order two, I(2). By taking the first difference,   LSC / LSM  , it becomes
I(1).
If all the variables have a unit root but form a stationary linear combination, these
variables are said to be cointegrated. To test for cointegration, we apply the Engle-Granger two-

47

There are several caveats worth mentioning. First, some of the variables rely on proxies; however, these are the
most commonly used measures in the literature and government reports. Second, it is likely that the high-income and
low-income households are affected by the price changes differently. Using the same deflator may result in an
upward bias of the effects on inequality.
48
Both the ADF and PP tests fail to reject the null of unit root in level but reject the null in first difference.
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step method (Engle and Granger, 1987), as suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991). The two
steps are as follows: (i) use OLS regression to estimate the model and obtain the long-run
equilibrium relationship; (ii) use the ADF test to check for stationarity of the obtained regression
residuals. The null hypothesis in the second step is that the variables are not cointegrated, i.e., the
residuals are not stationary. The rejection of the null implies that the variables are cointegrated.
Otherwise, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables. Beyer et al.
(1999) also use this method to estimate the long-run effects of trade liberalization on wage
inequality in Chile.
We estimate Eqs. (10) and (11) using   LSC / LSM  instead of LSC / LSM to meet the
requirement of the cointegration test; that is, all variables should have the same integration order,
I(1). By observing the trend in the quintile ratio ( RYD ) in Figure 3.1, we add three dummy
variables to the model: D01 , D09 , and D0215 . D01 is equal to 1 for 2001, and 0 otherwise;
D09 is equal to 1 for 2009, and 0 otherwise; D0215 is equal to 1 for 2002 to 2015, and 0

otherwise. D01 is used to capture the dot-com bubble in 2001, and D09 is used to capture the
financial crisis in 2009. Both events led to economic recessions in Taiwan and increased RYD .
D0215 is used to capture the structural change in RYD from 2002 to 2015. As shown in Figure

3.1, RYD remained fairly stable from 2002 to 2015, unlike the previous rising trend. Such
structure change is likely to be related to the industrial structure. As shown in Figures 3.3a and
3.4, the distribution of the number of employees in the labor market ( EMPSER / EMPIND ) and the
ratio of household average wage rate ( wH / wL ) have both remained stable since 2002.

3.5.2 Estimation Results
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Table 3.4 reports the estimation results of Eqs. (10) and (11), where the last row shows
the outcomes of the cointegration tests on the residuals ( ˆ1 , ˆ2 ). The ADF statistics (   ) in these
two equations reject the null of no cointegration, indicating that RYD and all the explanatory
variables are cointegrated. Hence, the estimated coefficients represent the long-run effects of the
explanatory variables on RYD . The coefficients of D01 and D09 are both positive and
statistically significant. This suggests that the employed persons of the lowest-income
households (unskilled labor) were more likely to lose jobs in the 2001 and 2009 recessions,
causing RYD to rise. The dummy variable D0215 has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient, which implies that RYD does not change much since the industrial structure remains
stable during this time period.
Considering the effects of trade liberalization on income inequality, we show that NX / Y
has a positive and statistically significant effect on RYD , which is consistent with the findings in
Chan et al. (1999) and Chen and Hsu (2001).49 When distinguishing the effects between

NX O / Y and NX NO / Y on RYD , we find that NX O / Y has a positive and statistically significant
effect, whereas the effect of NX NO / Y is negative and statistically insignificant.50 Overall, our
results show that trade liberalization increases income inequality in the long run, and it is mainly
attributed to net exports to OECD countries. As a MIOE, Taiwan is less skilled-labor-intensive
than most OECD countries and more skilled-labor-intensive than most non-OECD countries.
Based on the S-S theorem, net exports to OECD countries decrease the relative wage of skilled
labor as well as income inequality. On the other hand, net exports to non-OECD countries

49

They find a positive effect of NX / Y on the relative wage of skilled labor in Taiwan.
The signs of the effects of NX O / Y and NX NO / Y on RYD are the same as those obtained by Chen and Hsu
(2001), which uses the relative wage of skilled labor as the outcome variable.
50
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increase the relative wage of skilled labor and deteriorate income inequality. Therefore, our
results are different from the prediction using the S-S theorem.
Why are the trade effects of NX O / Y and NX NO / Y inconsistent with the S-S theorem?
As Chen and Hsu (2001) point out, the products exported to OECD countries are among the most
complicated varieties in Taiwan. Net exports to OECD countries could increase relative demand
for skilled labor for two reasons. First, through learning-by-doing, trading with more-developed
countries helps upgrade the technology level and thus increases the demand for skilled labor
(e.g., Chuang, 1998). Second, according to the capital accumulation-outsourcing hypothesis
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997), developing countries upgrade the range of intermediate
inputs that they produce and export through outsourcing of multinationals, which increases their
demand for skilled labor. While more skilled workers are employed in the sectors that export to
OECD countries, there are fewer skilled workers available to the sectors that export to nonOECD countries. In fact, exports to non-OECD countries (e.g., China) are usually more
unskilled-labor-intensive products in Taiwan, thereby demanding more unskilled labor.
Unfortunately, there is no data available for classifying the composition of exports to and
imports from OECD and non-OECD countries in Taiwan. To get a sense of the composition, we
use data from three major trade partners of Taiwan in 1998 and 2010. These include two OECD
countries (the U.S. and Japan) and one non-OECD country (China). As shown in Table 3.5, these
three countries together accounted for more than 45% of total exports and imports in Taiwan. In
both years, the shares of skilled-labor-intensive products in exports to the U.S. (73.7% and
77.9% in 1998 and 2010, respectively) and Japan (62.3% and 73.6%) were higher than those to
China (39.0% and 59.6%). Similarly, the shares of skilled-labor-intensive products in imports
from the U.S. (66.0% and 62.5%) and Japan (78.9% and 76.8%) were much higher than those
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from China (9.0% and 19.0%). Among the items of exports and imports, machinery and
electrical equipment are predominant. In both years, exports of machinery and electrical
equipment as a share of exports to the U.S. (58.7% and 55.7%) and Japan (46.4% and 53.8%)
were much higher than those to China (10.0% and 38.7%). More noticeably, the shares of
machinery and electrical equipment in imports were 40.8% and 39.3% from the U.S. and 51.6%
and 43.8% from Japan; however, none of them were imported from China. These findings
suggest that Taiwan imported skilled-labor-intensive machinery and electrical equipment from
technologically advanced countries. They were used to produce skill-labor-intensive products
and were mainly exported to OECD countries. This skill composition is consistent with the
learning model (e.g., Pissarides, 1997) and tends to increase the relative wage of skilled workers
(Chen and Hsu, 2001).
In contrast, Taiwan seemed to import unskilled-labor-intensive products from developing
countries and export more unskilled-labor-intensive products to non-OECD countries. Indeed,
the increase in net exports to non-OECD countries since the 1990s were largely attributed to
growing trade with China. The large foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in the past decades
was mainly due to cheaper unskilled labor in China, and most technology was less-advanced.
Accompanied with FDI, the Taiwanese multinationals also imported less-advanced intermediates
from Taiwan to produce products for sales in China. As a result, an increase in net exports to
China raised the relative demand for unskilled labor in Taiwan and decreased income inequality,
which is in line with the finding from non-OECD countries.
In terms of the effects of other explanatory variables on RYD , the sign and statistical
significance of the coefficients are the same between Eqs. (10) and (11), and their magnitudes are
close. This suggests that the estimated effects of these variables are robust. Technological

114

progress ( TFP ) has a positive and statistically significant effect on RYD ( 1 is around 0.04),
which is consistent with Chan et al. (1999) and Lai et al. (2019). IMF (2007) argues that
technological progress biased toward skilled labor is the most important cause of the
deterioration of income inequality in both developed and developing countries. Our results also
suggest that changes in industrial development policy since 1980, which leads to technological
progress biased toward skilled labor, is an important factor of RYD .
The effect of EMPSER / EMPIND on RYD is positive and statistically significant (  2 is
around 1.5), as expected. This indicates that faster growth in the service sector relative to the
industrial sector since the late 1980s absorbs more employees and in turn increases the relative
demand and the relative wage of skilled labor (Chan et al., 1999),51 resulting in an increase in

RYD . The massive expansion in higher education since the 1990s increases the relative supply of
skilled labor. We find that   LSC / LSM  has a negative effect on RYD , but it is statistically
insignificant.52 The effect of N H / N L on RYD is negative but statistically insignificant.53 As
demonstrated in Figure 3.1, the quintile ratio ( RYD ) remained relatively stable after 2002.
However, Figure 3.4 shows that N H / N L kept increasing while wH / wL became stable and then
declined after 2014. These trends imply that the main influence factor on inequality in household
payroll income ( RW ) is wH / wL but not N H / N L .
The financial market development ( CREDIT / Y ) has a positive and statistically

51

Mincer (1993) also finds that the rising trend in service employment reflects more demand for skilled labor, which
can partly explain the educational wage differential in the US.
52
This is consistent with the finding in Chen and Hsu (2001), which shows a statistically insignificant negative
effect on the relative wage of skilled labor, as well as the finding in Lai et al. (2019), which shows a negative effect
on income inequality.
53
Lai et al. (2019) also find an statistically insignificant effect of N H / N L on RYD .
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significant effect on RYD (  5 is around 0.6). With the implementation of several financial
reforms in Taiwan since the early 1980s, our results show that the high-income households seem
to gain more advantage from those reforms, and adversely affect income inequality. Finally, we
find that SWEXP / GB has a negative and statistically significant effect on RYD (  6 is about 3.7), which is consistent with previous studies and the expectation. This result suggests that the
large increases in social welfare and social insurance expenditures indeed lead to income
redistribution effects and reduce income inequality.
There are two key takeaways based on the results in Table 3.4. First, trade liberalization
overall raises income inequality, which is mainly attributed to net exports to OECD countries.
Second, among the domestic reforms, technological progress in favor of skilled labor, change in
industrial structure, and financial market reforms, all increase inequality. Although the massive
expansion in higher education increases the relative supply of skilled labor, it does not have a
significant effect on inequality. Increases in social welfare and social insurance expenditures help
reduce inequality.

3.5.3 Robustness Analysis
We assess the robustness of the results by estimating the following alternative
specifications. First, we separately analyze the effects of exports and imports to ensure the
robustness of the combined effects of net exports on RYD . The results are shown in Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 3.6. In Column (1), we find a positive effect of total exports ( X / Y ) and a
negative effect of total imports ( M / Y ), which is consistent with the previous result that the
effect of NX / Y on RYD is positive. In Column (2), we further estimate the effects of exports and
imports with OECD countries ( X O / Y , M O / Y ) and those with non-OECD countries ( X NO / Y ,
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M NO / Y ). As shown, the effect of X O / Y is positive and statistically significant, whereas the
effect of M O / Y is negative but statistically insignificant. These two effects coincide with the
skill composition of exports to and imports from OECD countries in Table 3.5. Since Taiwan
exports skilled-labor-intensive products to OECD countries and imports skilled-labor-intensive
products from OECD countries, RYD would be increased by X O / Y but decreased by M O / Y .
Altogether, the effects of X O / Y and M O / Y support the positive and statistically significant
effect of NX O / Y on RYD in Table 3.4. On the other hand, both exports and imports with nonOECD countries ( X NO / Y and M NO / Y ) have negative effects on RYD , but they are statistically
insignificant. Since the magnitude of the coefficient of X NO / Y (0.9836) is a greater than the
coefficient of M NO / Y (0.3416) in absolute terms, this can explain why the combined effect of

NX NO / Y is negative but statistically insignificant in Table 3.4. Overall, the separate effects of
exports and imports in Table 3.6 are consistent with the effects of net exports in Table 4. In
addition, the results of all the other variables are robust.
Second, we use the Gini coefficient ( GYD ) as an alternative indicator of income inequality
and re-estimate Eqs. (10) and (11). The results are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6.54
Since GYD has a value between 0 and 1 (where 0 denotes absolute equality, and 1 denotes
absolute inequality), the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients would be different from those
in Table 3.4. Regarding the effects of trend, both NX / Y and NX O / Y have a positive and
statistically significant effect, whereas NX NO / Y has a positive but statistically insignificant

54

We only report the estimated coefficients with their signs and statistical significance to save space. The detailed
results are available upon request.
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effect. These trade effects are consistent with the finding in Table 3.4, which suggests that trade
liberalization overall increases inequality and that the effect is mainly attributed to net exports to
OECD countries. With respect to domestic reforms, TFP and EMPSER / EMPIND have a positive
and statistically significant effect, and SWEXP / GB has a negative and statistically significant
effect. The effect of   LSC / LSM  is still insignificant, although its sign changes from negative
to positive. The effect of CREDIT / Y is still positive but becomes statistically insignificant,
suggesting that the financial reforms may not be as influential as other reforms. In general, the
results using GYD as an indicator of inequality are consistent with the results in Table 3.4.

3.5.4 Contributions to Income Inequality
Since the explanatory variables are measured in different units (ratio, index, percentage,
etc.), we cannot directly assess the contributions of each variable to income inequality from the
estimated coefficients in Table 3.4. To address this issue, we use the results in Table 3.4 (the
marginal long-run effect on RYD ) and the mean values in Table 3.A1 to calculate the long-run
mean effect of the following six variables that have a statistically significant effect on RYD :
NX / Y , NX O / Y , TFP , EMPSER / EMPIND , CREDIT / Y and SWEXP / GB . With these mean

effects, we can evaluate the relative importance of trade liberalization and domestic reforms on

RYD during the sample period.
As shown in Table 3.7, the total net exports have a positive long-run effect on RYD . A
one percentage point increase in NX / Y leads to a 1.4516 percent increase in RYD , ceteris
paribus. However, its long-run mean impact on RYD was only 0.0994. Noticeably, NX O / Y had
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a positive long-run effect on RYD (1.7321), but its long-run mean impact was negative (-0.0113).
This is because Taiwan has trade deficits with OECD countries since 1990 (with a mean value of
-0.65%), which reversely leads to a decrease in inequality.
Technological progress has the largest long-run mean effect on RYD , which is about 3.73.

EMPSER / EMPIND has the second largest long-run mean effect, and CREDIT / Y also contributes
to the rising inequality with a long-run mean effect of 0.71. Among domestic reforms, only
SWEXP / GB decreases income inequality, but it is less influential compared to the other

domestic reforms that increase RYD .
Based on the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.7, we can conclude that trade liberalization
overall raises household income inequality in Taiwan from 1980 to 2015, and this adverse effect
is mainly due to net exports to OECD countries. However, since trade liberalization leads to
trade diversion, causing trade deficits with OECD countries that in turn reducing inequality, the
overall impact of trade liberalization on inequality is relatively small. Considering all the
influence factors of income inequality, we show that domestic reforms, particularly technological
progress in favor of skilled labor, industrial structure change, and financial reforms, are the main
influence factors of the rising inequality.

3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study estimates the effects of trade liberalization and domestic reforms on income
inequality in Taiwan from 1980 to 2015. We construct an empirical model by decomposing the
sources of household income in the quintile ratio. Since there are many MIOEs that
simultaneously trade with more- and less-developed countries, it is important to distinguish the
trade effects between these two types of trade partners. We investigate the case of Taiwan and
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separately estimate of the effects of net exports to OECD and non-OECD countries on income
inequality. We also examine the contributions of various influence factors to the rising
inequality.
Our results suggest that trade liberalization overall increases inequality, but the long-run
mean impact is relatively small. Domestic reforms, such as technological progress in favor of
skilled labor, change in industrial structure, and financial reforms, have negative and larger
impacts on inequality than trade liberalization, indicating that they might be the main influence
factors of inequality.
Our findings on the trade effects of OECD and non-OECD countries diverge from the
prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We show that the negative effects of trade
liberalization on inequality are mainly resulted from trade with OECD countries. Although net
exports to OECD countries increase inequality, trade diversion due to liberalization leads to trade
deficits with OECD countries and in turn decreases the overall impact on inequality in the long
run. Our paper highlights the importance of distinguishing between trade partners, which might
be one possible reason for the mixed results in the literature.
Similar to Taiwan, many developing countries have endeavored in capital accumulation
and technological progress in order to promote economic growth and increase income levels.
Accompanied with economic growth, industrial structure has also changed over time, in
particular the rapid growth of the service sector. We demonstrate that both technological
progress in favor of skilled labor and the growth of the service sector increase the relative
demand for skilled labor, and they substantially increase income inequality. Although the
government increases social welfare and social insurance transfer payments to low-income
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families, their effects on inequality are limited. In the process of economic development, our
study shows that economic growth and income equality seem to be an inevitable trade-off.
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Figure 3.1: Quintile Ratio and Gini Coefficient
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Figure 3.2: Ratios of Net Exports to GDP
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Note: NX / Y denotes the ratio of total net exports to GDP; NX O / Y denotes the ratio of net exports to
OECD countries to GDP; NX NO / Y denotes the ratio of net exports to non-OECD countries to GDP.
Source: AREMOS Databank, Taiwan Economic Data Center.
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Figure 3.3: Trends of the Related Variables of Domestic Reforms
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Note: The horizontal axis in all panels denotes the calendar year (1980-2015). The vertical axis in each panel denotes
the corresponding variable shown. EMPSER / EMPIND denotes the ratio of the number of employees in the service sector
to the number of employees in the industrial sector. TFP denotes the total factor productivity index in industrial and
service sectors. LSC / LSM denotes the ratio of the number of employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher to those
with mandatory education or below. CREDIT / Y denotes the ratio of credit (loans and discounts) to the private sector
by monetary institutions to GDP. SWEXP / GB denotes the ratio of social welfare and social insurance expenditures
to government budget. More details about these variables are in Table A1 in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.4: Ratio of the Number of Persons Employed and Average Wage Rate Differential
between Highest- and Lowest-Income Households

Note: N H / N L denotes the ratio of the number of persons employed, and wH / wL denotes the average wage
rate differential. Household average wage rate ( w ) = household payroll income ( W )/the number of persons
employed per household ( N ).
Source: Household payroll income and the number of persons employed per household are from the RSFIE,
DGBAS.
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Table 3.1: Average Number of Persons Employed Per Household and Household Head
Educational Attainment of First and Fifth Quintiles
Household characteristics

1st quintile

5th quintile

Number of persons per household (person)
1980
3.62
5.80
1990
2.70
5.09
2000
1.99
4.65
2015
1.71
4.21
Number of persons employed per household (person)
1980
1.46
2.65
1990
1.06
2.59
2000
0.68
2.41
2015
0.46
2.32
Percentage of economic household heads with a bachelor’s degree or higher (%)
1980
1.23
19.93
1990
1.81
25.53
2000
2.63
30.42
2015
5.72
45.14
Source: RSFIE, DGBAS, ROC (Taiwan).
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Ratio
1.60
1.89
2.34
2.46
1.82
2.44
3.54
5.04
16.20
14.10
11.57
7.89

Table 3.2: Summary of Trade Policy Changes and Domestic Reforms in Taiwan
Policies
Trade liberalization:

Domestic reforms:
Industrial development
Higher education

Financial market

Social welfare and
social insurance

1980s

1990s

2000s~

1984: adopt trade
liberalization policy
1987: relax foreign
exchange control
1989: implement
managed floating
exchange rate
system

1993: allow indirect
trade with China

2002: allow direct trade
with China
2002: become a member of
WTO

1960~1990: Statute for
the Encouragement
of Investment (SEI)
1985: allow
establishment of new
universities/colleges

1991: Statute for
Upgrading Industry
(SUI)
1990s: expand the
number of
universities and
college students
1991: approve the set-up
of 15 new banks

2010: Statute for Industrial
Innovation (SII)

1990s: increase
spending on social
welfare
1995: implement
National Health
Insurance (NHI)

2008: implement National
Pension Insurance
(NPI)

1984: allow domestic
banks to set more
branches and foreign
banks to set branches
in Taiwan
1989: liberalize interest
rates of banks
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2000s: further increase the
number of universities
and college students
2002: first financial reform
2004: second financial
reform

Table 3.3: Unit Root Tests
Variable

ADF test

PP test

Level

1st difference

Level

1st difference

RYD

-1.6392(0)

-7.0157***(0)

-1.9887(8)

-7.5083***(8)

NX / Y

-2.1147(0)

-4.7989***(0)

-2.5119(8)

-4.7166***(8)

NX O / Y

-1.0175(0)

-4.3307***(0)

-1.3046(8)

-4.2162***(8)

NX NO / Y

-1.3752(0)

-7.0371***(0)

-1.4433(8)

-8.5193***(8)

TFP

-1.0947(0)

-4.9315***(0)

-1.0742(8)

-4.9808***(8)

NH / NL

0.3109(0)

-7.1021***(0)

1.3769(8)

-8.5317***(8)

EMPSER / EMPIND

-1.5435(0)

-4.8385***(0)

-1.4474(8)

-4.9557***(8)

LSC / LS M

-0.5569(5)

0.0365(4)

8.0075(8)

-0.7059(8)

  LSC / LSM 

0.2359(4)

-4.7517***(3)

-0.5676(8)

-10.7930***(8)

CREDIT / Y

-2.0804(1)

-3.4408**(0)

-1.6347(8)

-3.4988**(8)

SWEXP / GB

-1.0157(0)

-5.1741***(2)

-0.8279(8)

-6.4625***(8)

Note: Figures in the parentheses following test statistics   denote lag periods ( p ); for ADF test, p is chosen by
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) (max p =8); for PP test, p = 8. Critical values of 1%, 5%, and 10% significant
levels for ADF test are -3.64, -2.96, and -2.62, respectively; those for PP test are -3.65, -2.95, and -2.62, respectively.
***, **, and * denote significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Cointegration Tests and Estimations
Dependent Variable: RYD
Explanatory Variables
Const.
NX / Y
NX O / Y
NX NO / Y

Eq. (10)
coefficient
s.e.
0.1982
1.4516***

0.9136
0.4420

TFP
EMPSER / EMPIND
  LSC / LSM 

0.0366**
1.5227***
-0.2276

0.0148
0.3270
1.0060

NH / NL
CREDIT / Y
SWEXP / GB
D 01
D 09
D0215
Adj. R 2
Durbin-Watson stat.
Obs.
Residual ADF stat. (   )

-0.1382
0.0985
0.5052**
0.2283
-3.6800***
1.2234
0.8092***
0.1170
0.1943*
0.1126
0.2949**
0.1161
0.9846
2.1953
36
-6.3678***(0)

Eq. (11)
coefficient
s.e.
-0.1734

0.9686

1.7321***
-0.3284
0.0414**
1.4805***
-0.4065

0.5069
1.6587
0.0153
0.3277
1.0141

-0.1505
0.0986
0.6348**
0.2553
-3.6915***
1.2177
0.8188***
0.1168
0.2147*
0.1135
0.3922**
0.1449
0.9848
2.2667
36
-6.6153***(0)

Note: Figures in the parentheses following residual ADF test statistics (   ) denote lag periods ( p ) and are chosen
by SIC (max p =8); critical values of 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels are -5.2812, -4.7101, and -4.4309,
respectively (Phillips and Quliaris, 1990). ***, **, and * denote significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.

132

Table 3.5: Composition of Exports and Imports of Major Trade Partners (Unit: %)
1998

2010

U.S.

Japan

China

U.S.

Japan

China

Share in Taiwan’s total exports

26.6

8.4

17.9

11.5

6.6

28.0

Share in Taiwan’s total imports

18.0

25.8

3.9

10.1

20.7

14.3

Share of skilled-labor-intensive
products in exports
Share of skilled-labor-intensive
products in imports
Share of machinery and electrical
equipment in exports
Share of machinery and electrical
equipment in imports

73.7

62.3

39.0

77.9

73.6

59.6

66.0

78.9

9.0

62.5

76.8

19.0

58.7

46.4

10.0

55.7

53.8

38.7

40.8

51.6

0.0

39.3

43.8

0.0

Note: Following Chen and Hsu (2001), we classify machinery and electrical equipment, chemicals, transportation
equipment, and basic metals and articles thereof as skilled-labor-intensive products.
Source: The shares of Taiwan’s total exports and imports in 1998 are from Taiwan Statistical Data Book (for the US
and Japan), Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly (for China), and Chen and Hsu (2001). Data in 2010 are from
Taiwan Statistical Data Book (2016).
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Table 3.6: Robustness Tests
RYD

Dependent Variable
Explanatory Variables
Const.
X /Y
M /Y
XO / Y
MO / Y
X NO / Y
M NO / Y
NX / Y
NX O / Y
NX NO / Y
TFP
EMPSER / EMPIND
  LSC / LS M 

NH / NL
CREDIT / Y
SWEXP / GB
D 01
D 09
D0215
Adj. R 2
Durbin-Watson stat.
Obs.
Residual ADF stat. (   )

(1)
0.0902
1.1324§
-1.4753***

GYD

(2)
-0.3185

(3)
0.1304***

(4)
0.1229***

1.5704**
-0.2308
-0.9836
-0.3416
0.0636***

0.0425**
1.3798***
-0.1256
-0.1389
0.4160†
-3.5528***
0.8207***
0.1895§
0.3340**
0.9842
2.2140
36
-6.4548***(0)

0.0460***
0.9417**
-0.1722
-0.1274
0.7072**
-2.7806**
0.9257***
0.2662**
0.6008***
0.9865
2.4038
36
-7.1956***(0)

0.0013**
0.0738***
0.0157
-0.0074*
0.0057
-0.1348***
0.0200***
0.0010
0.0025
0.9838
1.9816
36
-5.7556***(0)

0.0692***
0.0276
0.0014***
0.0729***
0.0121
-0.0076*
0.0083
-0.1351***
0.0202***
0.0014
0.0044
0.9840
1.9798
36
-5.7606***(0)

Notes: See Table 4. § and † represent 11% and 14% significance levels, respectively. Note that all the newly added
variables ( X / Y , M / Y , X O / Y , M O / Y , X NO / Y , M NO / Y , GYD ) have a unit root, I(1), which meets the
requirement of a cointegration test. As shown in the last row, all the residual ADF tests reject the null of no
cointegration, suggesting that RYD and GYD both have a long-run equilibrium relationship with their explanatory
variables.
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Table 3.7: Long-Run Mean Impacts on Income Inequality
Explanatory variable
NX / Y

NX O / Y
TFP

EMPSER / EMPIND
CREDIT / Y

SWEXP / GB

Marginal effect
1.4516
1.7321

Mean
0.0685
-0.0065

Long-run mean effect
0.0994
-0.0113

0.0414
1.4805

89.9973
1.3491

3.7259
1.9973

0.6348
-3.6915

1.1117
0.1239

0.7057
-0.4574

Note: The long-run marginal effects are from Table 4, and the mean values are from Table A1.
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Appendix
Table 3.A1: Variable Definition, Source, and Summary Statistics
Variable
RYD

NX / Y

NX O / Y

NX NO / Y
TFP
NH / NL

EMPSER / EMPIND

LSC / LS M

CREDIT / Y

SWEXP / GB

Definition
Quintile ratio, i.e., ratio of
disposable income share of the
highest 20% to that of the
lowest 20% households

Source
Report on the Survey of
Family Income and
Expenditure, DGBAS,
Executive Yuan,
Taiwan (2016)
Ratio of total net exports to
AREMOS Taiwan
GDP
Economical Statistical
Databank, Taiwan
Economic Data Center
Ratio of net exports to OECD
AREMOS Taiwan
countries to GDP
Economical Statistical
Databank
Ratio of net exports to nonAREMOS Taiwan
OECD countries to GDP
Economical Statistical
Databank
Total factor productivity index
Trends in Multifactor
in industrial and service sectors, Productivity (various
2010=100
years)
Ratio of the number of
Report on the Survey of
employed persons per
Family Income and
household of the highest 20% to Expenditure, DGBAS,
that of the lowest 20%
Executive Yuan,
households
Taiwan (various years)
Ratio of the number of
Yearbook of Manpower
employees in the service sector Survey Statistics,
to the number of employees in
DGBAS, Executive
the industrial sector
Yuan, Taiwan (various
years)
Ratio of the number of
AREMOS Taiwan
employees with a bachelor’s
Economical Statistical
degree or higher to those with
Databank
mandatory education or lower
Ratio of credit (loans and
Financial Statistics
discounts) to the private sector
Monthly, Taiwan
by monetary institutions to
District, ROC, The
GDP
Central Bank of China
(Taiwan) (various
years)
Ratio of social welfare and
National Statistics,
social insurance expenditures to Republic of China
government budget. Because of (Taiwan)
lack of data for 1980, data on
1981 is used as a proxy.
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Mean
5.4349

S.D.
0.6944

0.0685

0.0434

-0.0065

0.0670

0.0750

0.0415

89.9973

8.8843

3.2081

0.9559

1.3491

0.2767

0.8918

0.7655

1.1117

0.3164

0.1239

0.0518
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